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Arbitration With Government 
 
By Jack I. Garvey*© 
 
I. INTRODUCTION  
Arbitration is today employed for dispute resolution 
well beyond its origins in private contractual relations.  It is 
now widely adopted by both state and federal governments 
for contracting with the private sector, government to 
government relationships, both at state and federal levels, 
state governments’ engagement with federal agencies and 
their bureaucracies, and for the contractual and treaty 
relationships between the United States and other nations.1  
This broadening engagement of government with 
arbitral process has generally occurred with, at best, only 
sporadic and contextual examination of whether there are 
unique considerations that distinguish arbitration from its 
private sector employment.  This article will seek to draw, 
from the variety of contexts of arbitration with government, 
these special considerations for all lawyers engaged in 
arbitration with government.   
There is a need to understand these unique concerns 
not only to maximize the societal benefits arbitration affords, 
but to understand when government’s involvement imposes 
special limits on the utility and value of arbitration.  This is 
necessary to ensure not only that arbitration can be 
successfully employed to serve public policy, but also to 
 
* Professor of Law, University of San Francisco School of Law, J.D. Harvard 
Law School, 1968; AB Harvard College, 1964.  My thanks to Laura Odujinrin 
for the consistent excellence of her research assistance. 
1 Stephen Hayford, The Federal Arbitration Act: Key to Stabilizing and 
Strengthening the Law of Labor Arbitration, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 
521, 522–74 (2000); Ksenia Polonskaya, Diversity in the Investor-State 
Arbitration: Intersectionality Must Be A Part of the Coversation, 19 
MELBOURNE J. OF INT'L L. 259, 260–97 (2018); Stavros Brekoulakis, 
International Arbitration Scholarship and the Concept of Arbitration Law, 36 
Fordham Int’l L.J. 745, 745–87 (2013). 
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prevent its weaponization for engagement to subvert the 
public interest government is supposed to secure. 2  
We see ambivalence about the value of arbitration 
with government, reflected in the hesitancy with which U.S. 
governmental agencies have moved in implementing arbitral 
process, even when mandated by legislation.3  The reason, 
assuredly, is the perception that arbitration may sacrifice the 
advantages other dispute resolution affords for 
government—domesticly, legal process of trial and appellate 
courts, and internationally, diplomacy.  There is the 
pervasive perception that arbitration imposes undue risk of 
diminishing or negating the public interest that government 
is supposed to secure.4  How this occurs and how it may best 
be prevented is also the subject of this article.   
Arbitration, agreed by way of a contract clause or 
ad hoc after a dispute has developed, is therefore, at bottom, 
a political as well as legal matter.  For the government 
lawyer, as representative of the state, the choice to arbitrate 
is not simply a choice of legal process, but how best to meet 
governmental policy objectives.  For the lawyer at issue with 
government, the choice to arbitrate may be the means to 
mitigate the otherwise overwhelming resources and power 
of government.  The choice to arbitrate, and in what form, 
must therefore be evaluated for the government lawyer and 
 
2 David Chriki, Strapping Down Regulatory Space with Investment Arbitration: 
A New Breed of International SLAPPS, 51 GEO. J. INT'L L. 415, 416–19, 428–
29 (2020). 
3 Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C.A. §§ 1–16 (Westlaw through Pub. L. 
No. 116–58); Administrative Dispute Resolution Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 571–84 
(1996); see Daniel Marcus & Jeffrey M. Senger, ADR and the Federal 
Government: Not Such Strange Bedfellows After All, 66 MO. L. REV. 709, 710–
12 (2001); Charles Pou, Jr., Federal Agency ADR: Turning Square Corners to 
Meet Real Challenges, 49 S. TEX. L. REV. 1019, 1020–37 (2008). 
4 It is a common view that “the major arbitration issue of our time” is “the 
imposition on consumers and employees of arbitration agreements that 
effectively deprive them of the ability to vindicate their federal- or state-law 
rights.”  Michael J. Yelnosky, Fully Federalizing the Federal Arbitration Act, 
90 OR. L. REV. 729, 736 (2012). 
2
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the lawyers representing private interest working in the 
trenches of dispute resolution with government, by weighing 
the strategic advantages and disadvantages of arbitration, 
against alternative strategies for dispute resolution, and to 
know what considerations should determine the right 
choices.   
 
II. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF 
ARBITRATION IN RELATION TO DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION WITH GOVERNMENT   
A. THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM   
What, then, are the advantages and disadvantages?  
Why, especially, should government, dressed with deep 
pockets and the emblems of public interest, abandon the 
alternative prerogatives of sovereignty to be obtained 
through constitutionally established adjudicatory process?   
There is, of course, the conventional wisdom about 
arbitration: that arbitration, irrespective of the parties, is 
cheaper, faster, less encumbered by evidentiary and 
procedural rules, and broad in its discovery.  The choice of 
arbitration also can serve to design the process of dispute 
resolution to the distinctive nature of any dispute, as for 
example, imposing limits on the litigable issues, discovery 
and evidence, and even available remedies.   
The choice to arbitrate is generally also seen as 
assuring a fundamentally greater dimension of finality than 
other means of dispute resolution.5  This follows because the 
grounds for appeal of an arbitral award are so limited, 
offering considerable avoidance of much of the risk, time, 
and costs of appeal.6  This latter advantage of arbitration may 
 
5 Peter Hirst, Do Arbitration Users Really Value Finality?, KLUWER 
ARBITRATION BLOG (June 4, 2018), 
http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2018/06/04/arbitration-users-
really-value-finality/. 
6 Section 10 of the FAA, for example, echoed in most arbitral rules, permits the 
court to vacate an arbitration award only: (a)(1) “where the award was procured 
by corruption, fraud, or undue means;” (a)(2) “where there was evident 
partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them;” and (a)(3) “where 
3
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be particularly advantageous for arbitration involving 
government and its agencies, when time is critical, as for 
example environmental and water rights disputes.   
Another item of the conventional wisdom about 
arbitration, that the government attorney would be well 
advised to take into account, is that arbitration can provide 
greater opportunity to secure a decision-maker known to 
have knowledge, and also experience, in the field of law and 
controversy at issue.  This is obviously true in contra-
distinction to the politically appointed judge or however 
well-vetted jury.  In contrast to the chance and often arbitrary 
nature of assignment to a litigation judge—who may or may 
not have the requisite expertise to adequately understand a 
dispute—arbitration affords all parties the opportunity to 
weigh in on the arbitrator’s appointment, and accordingly 
the arbitrators qualifications.7  Indeed, the value of this 
opportunity goes well beyond the technical or legal expertise 
of the decision-maker, to the even more fundamental and 
important questions of competence and minimization of 
bias.8  The professional competence of the litigation judge 
assigned one’s case is the risk any lawyer runs in going to 
court.  It may be of critical value to avoid that risk—
particularly for government lawyers often charged with 
politically significant cases.9  The ability to vet and choose 
the decision-maker that arbitration affords, accordingly, is of 
special value. 
 
the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, 
upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and 
material to the controversy; or of any other misbehaviour by which the rights 
of any party have been prejudiced.”  9 U.S.C.A. § 10 (2002); see also CAL .  
C IV .  PROC .  CODE  § 128.6 (repealed 2011).  
7 Arbitrator, Judge, or Jury; Pick Your Poison, SMITH AMUNDSEN (May 24, 
2017), https://www.salawus.com/insights-alerts-ArbitratorJudgeorJury.html. 
8 Matt Hoffman, The Advantages and Disadvantages of Arbitration vs. Court 
Litigation, TUCKER ARENSBERG (Feb. 13, 2020), 
https://www.tuckerlaw.com/2015/02/13/advantages-disadvantages-arbitration-
vs-court-litigation/. 
9 Joseph R. Grodin, Political Aspects of Public Sector Interest Arbitration, 64 
CAL. L. REV. 678, 682 (1976). 
4
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B. THE NAIVETE OF THE CONVENTIONAL 
WISDOM 
The conventional wisdom about arbitration, 
however, requires significant qualification—especially as to 
its most acclaimed attributes—when considered in the 
context of arbitration with government.  Arbitration is 
usually faster and cheaper—but not necessarily so.10  
Arbitration in general results in substantial reduction in time 
and costs relative to the discovery and motion practice that 
burdens court litigation.11  But particularly for arbitration 
with government—and in general—as the use of arbitration 
has expanded throughout the global economy, it has become 
increasingly more likely that complex substantial, economic, 
and political interests are at stake in arbitration.12  This added 
complexity often belies the conventional wisdom of “faster 
and cheaper.” 
The cost and efficiency contrast with litigation is 
less pronounced the larger and more complex the case.  As 
the stakes and complexity are greater, arbitration is more 
likely to be infused with the more formal procedures of 
litigation, such as discovery, motions practice, submission of 
briefs, and written awards.13  This has importantly altered the 
character of arbitration in ways that contradict the 
conventional wisdom.14   
 
10 Duane Horning, Should You Agree to Arbitration?, CALIFORNIA BUSINESS 
LAW GROUP (Jan. 30, 2017), http://www.cblg.biz/resources/arbitration/should-
you-agree-to-arbitration-/. 
11 Horning, supra note 10. 
12 See generally Guide to International Arbitration, LATHAM & WATKINS 
(2019), https://www.lw.com/thoughtleadership/guide-to-international-
arbitration-2017. 
13 Todd B. Carver & Albert A. Vondra, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Why It 
Doesn’t Work and Why It Does, HARVARD BUS. REV., May–June 1994. 
Available at https://hbr.org/1994/05/alternative-dispute-resolution-why-it-
doesnt-work-and-why-it-does. 
14 It is concerning that arbitration is commonly just as costly and time 
consuming as court litigation, and increasingly dominated by legal formalities; 
see generally, Alain Frécon, Delaying Tactics in Arbitration, 59 DISP. RESOL. 
5
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It is important to view with skepticism the most 
common proposition of the conventional wisdom about 
arbitration—that it is faster and more cost effective.  That 
proposition may or may not be true, depending on the scope 
and import of the matter at hand.    
There is indeed abundant demonstration, that for 
any particular matter, arbitration is often neither faster nor 
more cost effective than other modalities of dispute 
resolution.15  This may be so for any number of reasons. One 
of the most significant reasons—at least in U.S. arbitration—
is that one of the few bases on which an arbitrator’s award 
can be reversed is when the arbitrator has refused to entertain 
relevant evidence.16  
In general, arbitrators are accorded broad discretion 
as to evidentiary decisions in favor of expeditious hearing.17  
But courts do find due process violations where arbitrators 
exclude material evidence, and this may be a basis for a court 
to vacate an arbitral award.18  So—professional ethics 
 
J. 40 (2005); Gerald F. Phillips, Is Creeping Legalism Infecting Arbitration, 58 
DISP. RESOL. J. 37 (2003); Perry A. Zirkel & Andriy Krahmal, Creeping 
Legalism in Grievance Arbitration: Fact or Fiction?, 16 OHIO. ST. J. DISP. 
RESOL. 243 (2001). 
15 See generally, Frécon, supra note 14; Phillips, supra note 14; Zirkel & 
Krahmal, supra note 14. 
16 See, e.g., Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552, 582 n.4, U.S. 576 
(2008) (citing 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4).; Royal All. Assocs., Inc., v. Liebhaber, 2 
Cal. App. 5th 1092, 1107–08 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016). 
17 See e.g., Legion Ins. Co. v. Ins. Gen. Agency, Inc., 822 F.2d, 541, 543 (5th 
Cir. 1987); Reed & Martin, Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 439 F.2d 1268 
(2d Cir. 1971); Stephen J. Ware, Vacating Legally-Erroneous Arbitration 
Awards, 6 Y.B. ARB. & MEDIATION 56, 70 (2014); 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4); see, e.g., 
American Arbitration Association, Commercial Arbitration Rules, Rule R-
30(b); Sherrock Brothers, Inc. v. DaimlerChrysler Motors Co., LLC, 260 
Fed.Appx. 497, 502 (3rd Cir. 2008). 
18 See, e.g., Confinco, Inc. v. Bakrie & Bros., 395 F.Supp. 613, 615–16 
(S.D.N.Y. 1975); Harvey Aluminum v. United Steel Workers of America, 263 
F.Supp. 488 (C.D. Cal. 1967); see also Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 
10(a)(1)–(4) (2002) (“[i]n any of the following cases the United States court in 
and for the district wherein the award was made may make an order vacating 
the award upon the application of any party to the arbitration . . . where the 
arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon 
6
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notwithstanding—the inclination of the arbitrator, in order 
to avoid reversal of his or her award, is to admit into the 
proceedings most if not all evidence offered—however 
tenuous its relationship to the issue—resulting in significant 
impacts on costs and speed.19   
Furthermore, for the arbitrator, the exaggerated 
admission of evidence is compounded by the reality that the 
arbitrator is typically paid on an hourly or daily basis.20  The 
arbitrator may be inclined to accept the opportunity that 
“relevance” presents in order to run up additional time.  To 
the contrary, the salaried judge—whose salary is the same 
no matter how heavy or light the caseload—is inclined to do 
all he or she can to lighten the caseload.21  Thus, when there 
is a dispute as to the scope of arbitral jurisdiction, relegating 
all possible issues to arbitration improves the income of the 
arbitrator and lightens the caseload for the judge—an 
 
sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to 
the controversy.”).  
19 This can extend the time and cost considerably beyond a comparable 
litigation.  Adjudication before a litigation judge is much more constricted by 
rules limiting the admission of evidence – for example, the rule precluding 
hearsay evidence where a witness would state what he claims to have heard 
from someone else.  Compare Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation 
Procedures, Rule 34 (2013 Am. Arbitration Ass’n) (stating “[c]onformity to 
legal rules of evidence shall not be necessary . . .  [t]he arbitrator shall determine 
the admissibility, relevance, and materiality of the evidence offered and may 
exclude evidence deemed by the arbitrator to be cumulative or irrelevant”), with 
JAMS Comprehensive Arbitration Rules & Procedures, Rule 32 (2014 JAMS) 
(stating “[s]trict conformity to the rules of evidence is not required, except that 
the Arbitrator shall apply applicable law relating to privileges and work 
product.  The Arbitrator shall consider evidence that he or she finds relevant 
and material to the dispute, giving the evidence such weight as is appropriate.  
The Arbitrator may be guided in that determination by principles contained in 
the Federal Rules of Evidence or any other applicable rules of evidence.  The 
Arbitrator may limit testimony to exclude evidence that would be immaterial or 
unduly repetitive, provided that all Parties are afforded the opportunity to 
present material and relevant evidence”). 
20 Costs of Arbitration, AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, 
https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/document_repository/AAA228_Costs_
of_Arbitration.pdf, at 2. 
21 Judicial Compensation, UNITED STATES COURTS, 
https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-compensation. 
7
Garvey: Arbitration With Government
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2021
[Vol. 21: 281, 2021]                                     Arbitration With Government 
                                             PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL  
 
 288 
attractive disposition for both.  Moreover—as to the 
consequences of cost—it is important to keep in mind that 
each party is paying up to three arbitrators by the hour or by 
the day, along with substantial administrative fees when an 
arbitral institution is involved.  In judicial litigation, of 
course, the state—i.e., the citizen-taxpayer—pays both for 
the justice system and the judge. 
Another item of the conventional wisdom about 
arbitration being superior to judicial litigation that the 
government lawyer needs to consider more critically is that 
arbitration can better serve to preserve a working 
relationship between the claimant and respondent when 
resolving a particular dispute.22  The effort to capitalize on 
this advantage is well illustrated in private and governmental 
context by the standard construction contract of the 
American Institute of Architects, wherein the architect is in 
effect designated as an arbitrator charged to resolve disputes 
between owner and contractor such that construction can 
proceed to completion—notwithstanding the disputes that 
almost invariably arise before arriving at completion.23   
However, it is the common experience that once the 
contractor and owner hire lawyers, the relationship between 
contractor and owner is destroyed, rarely allowing its 
 
22 Stephen S. Strick, Alternative Dipsute Resolution, ARBITRATION & 
MEDIATION SERVICES (Last accessesd Mar. 2021), 
https://www.arbitratemediate.com/alternative-dispute-resolution. 
23 Under the American Institute of Architects standard form contracts, the 
architect serves as the initial arbiter of disputes between contractors and owners.  
If the architect arbitrator’s decision is unacceptable, the standard form contract 
then calls for formal mediation, followed by arbitration.  This method of dispute 
resolution is intended to resolve disputes “without delay and expense of 
courtroom proceedings.” You and Your Architect, AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF 
ARCHITECTS, 7 (2007), https://aiala.com/wp-content/uploads/You-and-Your-
Architect.pdf; see also Richard H. Steen, Construction Industry ADR: Setting 
the Standard, 217-Oct. N.J. LAW. MAG. 23, 24 (2002); 2 ALVIN L. ARNOLD & 
MARSHALL TRACHT, CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT FINANCING § 9:63 
(Thompson West, 3d ed. 2009). 
8
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reconstruction.24  The project, whatever it may be, simply 
stops while the lawyers argue and run up fees, irrespective 
of the availability of an architect to serve as arbitrator.25 
In governmental arbitration, stopping may result in 
significant collateral damage and may not be otherwise 
feasible for practical or political reasons.26  The need to get 
along with the various constituencies that government 
governs, and the private and governmental partners with 
which government engages under contract on a continuing 
basis, is one factor that makes arbitration more attractive for 
government than judicial litigation.27  This can be true for 
disputes between government agencies that must continue in 
a cooperative relationship, for disputes between a 
government agency and a public/private partnership, or 
between government and an entity with which the 
government necessarily has a long-term evolving 
relationship.28  
The conventional wisdom that arbitration can help 
sustain an important relationship can be correct, and 
especially advantageous for government and its agencies.  
Relatedly, for arbitration involving government, arbitration 
can assure greater confidentiality than litigation and thereby 
 
24 See Cara Shimkus Hall & Jeffrey S. Wolfe, The How and Why of Alternative 
Dispute Resolution: What It Means to the Architect and the Owner, 8 
AIARCHITECT (2001), 
http://info.aia.org/aiarchitect/thisweek/tw0824/0824tw2rskmgmt.pdf (“Unlike 
mediation, where the goal is to reach a compromise resolution, arbitration is an 
adversarial process — one side opposing the other, with a neutral and 
disinterested third party. . . .”). 
25 Hall & Wolfe, supra note 24.  
26 PAMELA ESTERMAN, MICHAEL KENNEALLY, JR. AND HOWARD PROTTER, 
THE BENEFITS OF ALTRNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION FOR RESOLVING 
MUNICIPAL DISPUTES 1 (2011), 
https://nysba.org/NYSBA/Sections/Dispute%20Resolution/Dispute%20Resol
ution%20PDFs/Municipalwhitepaper12-21-2010.pdf (“When a dispute 
involves a municipality, the costs of resolving it will typically be borne by the 
taxpayers either directly through taxation, or indirectly through increased 
insurance premiums.”). 
27 See ESTERMAN, KENNEALLY, JR. & PROTTER, supra note 26. 
28 See ESTERMAN, KENNEALLY, JR. & PROTTER, supra note 26. 
9
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help preserve existing or long-term relationships for 
government procurement and socio-economic programs.29  
So facilitation of long-term relationships is one element of 
the conventional wisdom about arbitration to be 
acknowledged where such relationships should be 
facilitated.30 
But as to confidentiality facilitating arbitration, the 
conventional wisdom is again short on deeper consideration 
when arbitration is with the government.  There is, in 
general, a presumption of confidentiality in arbitration.31  All 
major institutional arbitration rules guarantee the 
confidentiality of arbitral hearings,32 and typically the award 
is kept private, although as with all matters in arbitration, the 
parties can agree otherwise.33  In commercial litigation, the 
principle of confidentiality serves to secure such matters as 
trade secrets and reputation, and avoiding stock impacts, and 
thereby, the theory goes, encourages more candid expression 
by the parties and hence more expeditious results than 
courtroom litigation.34  Moreover, there may be situations, 
 
29 See ESTERMAN, KENNEALLY, JR. & PROTTER, supra note 26. 
30 See ESTERMAN, KENNEALLY, JR. & PROTTER, supra note 26. 
31 Alexis C. Brown, Presumption Meets Reality: An Exploration of the 
Confidentiality Obligation in International Commercial Arbitration, 16 AM. U. 
INT’L L.REV. 969, 970 (2001). 
32 See, e.g., U.S. Department of Justice, Confidentiality in Federal Alternative 
Dispute Resolution Programs, 65 Fed. Reg. 83085, 83085-95, 
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2000/12/29/00-
33247/confidentiality-in-federal-alternative-dispute-resolution-programs 
(discussing limitations on confidentiality in U.S. Federal arbitration).  Dispute 
resolution communications are also protected from disclosure under the 
Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552, or for use as evidence 
in a court, 5 U.S.C. §574.  As to international arbitration, see, e.g., G.A. Res. 
65/22 (Dec. 6, 2011); 2010 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, art. 21(3), 28(3) 
(2010). 
33 Hall & Wolfe, supra note 24 (“[T]here are no formal rules of pro- cedure or 
evidence governing the actual arbitration, apart from those adopted by the 
parties themselves.”). 
34 Brown, supra note 31, at 972 n. 8, 1008; U.S. Department of Justice, 
Confidentiality in Federal Alternative Dispute Resolution Programs, 65 Fed. 
Reg. 83085, 83085–95 (2000), 
10
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more likely in a mixed civil–criminal context, where the 
assurance of confidentiality to the parties or third parties, 
may also be productive in securing information that would 
otherwise be concealed from public view.  The public 
interest and the interests of the parties and third parties may 
also be served by confidentiality where the relationship of 
the parties could be disrupted and potentially destroyed by 
publicity.35  For labor disputes, for example, arbitration and 
the confidentiality it affords may be valued as serving 
preservation of a viable employer–employee relationship 
and providing a more congenial environment for employee 
reinstatement.36  
But should a government lawyer always prefer the 
confidentiality that arbitration can more likely assure than 
courtroom litigation?  This should always be a threshold 
question for the government lawyer, and the answer will 
vary by context.  
It is always tempting, of course, to extend a blanket 
of confidentiality over one’s affairs, whether arising in the 




35 Christopher B. Kaczmarek, Public Law Deserves Public Justice: Why Public 
Law Arbitrators Should be Required to Issue Written, Public Opinions, 4 EMP. 
RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 295 (2000). 
36 Randall Thomas, Erin O’Hara & Kenneth Martin, Arbitration Clauses in 
CEO Employment Contracts: An Empirical and Theoretical Analysis, 63 
VAND. L. REV. 959, 971 (2010). 
37 See Michael Barbaro, The Daily: Silenced, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/podcasts/the-daily.  Michael Barbaro of The Daily 
reviews the elaborate system that has developed to silence women who level 
accusations against powerful men.  One of those women is Stephanie Clifford 
(known as Stormy Daniels), a pornographic actress who claims to have had an 
affair with American President, Donald J. Trump.  Trump’s lawyer negotiated 
a contract with Stephanie Clifford to prevent exposing their relationship to 
public scrutiny and potential legal charges.  Barbaro emphasizes that the 
freedom to privately resolve disputes and avoid judicial or public scrutiny of 
even the most egregious conduct has become engrained in dispute resolution at 
the highest level of U.S. political and social society.  Barbaro opines that the 
ability to pay for zero transparency of such conduct is a system unlikely to 
disappear from U.S. culture in the long-term because of its widespread use; see 
11
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confidentiality may be vice or virtue.38  And confidentiality, 
though touted in private context as expediting conflict 
resolution, is generally vice for the government lawyer 
working in the various arenas of public interest.39  For the 
public interest, publicity and transparency are often essential 
virtues, not to be avoided, but to be cherished.40 
When Congress approved the 1996 amendments to 
the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act, it sought to 
strike a balance between open government and the protection 
of confidentiality to facilitate and support alternative dispute 
resolution.41  Consistent with this general thrust of the 
amendments, the presumption was in favor of 
confidentiality.42  Congress, however, also listed a number 
of situations where disclosure would be permissible and a 
process for securing disclosure.43  Given the case-specific 
nature of the tension between confidentiality and disclosure, 
 
also Toby Luckhurst, The Stormy Daniels-Donald Trump story explained, BBC 
NEWS (Mar. 11, 2018), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-43334326. 
38 See Kaczmarek, supra note 35. 
39 Kaczmarek, supra note 35. 
40 Brown, supra note 31 at 1013-14, 1017 (stating transparency is also of value 
to the arbitral process, as by improving the predictability of arbitral 
proceedings).  Brown, supra. at 1019 (discussing the same in training 
arbitrators).  Kaczmarek, supra note 35 (suggesting to create pressure to 
improve the quality of arbitral awards by exposing the award and its reasoning 
to critique).  Hans Smit, The Future of International Commercial Arbitration: 
A Single Transnational Institution?, 25 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 9, 31-32 
(1986) (providing exposure to judge the qualification of arbitrators).  For 
lessons as to the adverse social consequences of arbitral confidentiality in 
international arbitration involving governments, see Anthony Depalma, Nafta’s 
Powerful Little Secret; Obscure Tribunals Settle Disputes, but Go Too Far, 
Critics Say, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2001), 
http//www.nytimes.com/2001/03/11/business/nafta-s-powerful-little-secret-
obscure-tribunals-settle-disputes-but-go-too-far.html. 
41 Charles Pou, Jr., Gandhi Meets Eliot Ness: 5th Circuit Ruling Raises 
Concerns About Confidentiality in Federal Agency ADR, 24 ADMIN. & REGUL. 
L. NEWS 5, 7 (1999). 
42 Pou, Jr., supra note 41, at 7. 
43 Pou, Jr., supra note 41, at 5. 
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the result was to leave resolution of that tension to the courts, 
essentially within broad parameters.44   
Many states, including perhaps most prominently 
California, have attempted to remove the cloak of 
confidentiality (which arbitration normally affords) from 
arbitration involving governmental policy, for example, by 
banning forced arbitration at the workplace.45  And for the 
attorney representing government in arbitration, the general 
presumption should be against confidentiality.  Blanket 
confidentiality is normally not necessary nor appropriate to 
secure public interests.46  If there is information requiring 
secrecy, there is the much preferred alternative of selective 
preclusion of such information from the arbitral award and 
its reasoning.47  Making exceptions and denying 
transparency for such reasons as ‘reputational concerns’ can 
otherwise too easily become euphemisms for avoiding 
disclosure of corruption and other activity that may be 
harmful to the public.48  Therefore, exceptions favoring 
confidentiality for governmental arbitration should be 
narrowly selected and narrowly construed to prevent an 
escape from public accountability.  And in service of the 
public interest, we must place the burden of proving the 
merit of the exception in arbitration with government 
squarely on the proponent of ‘confidentiality.’ 
 
44 Pou, Jr., supra note 41, at 7; see also Mark H. Grunewald, Freedom of 
Information and Confidentiality Under the Administrative Dispute Resolution 
Act, 9 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 985 (1996); Admin. Conference of the U.S., 
Recommendation No. 95–96, ADR Confidentiality and the Freedom of 
Information Act, 60 Fed. Reg. 43, 115 (1995). 
45 See Laurence Darmiento, Judge Halts California Law Banning Forced 
Arbitration at the Workplace, LOS ANGELES TIMES (Dec. 30, 2019, 5:28 PM), 
https://www.latimes.com/business/story/2019-12-30/california-forced-
arbitration-law-blocked; Grunewald, supra note 44 at 987.  
46 Grunewald, supra note 44, at 987–9 (1996); see generally, Catherine A. 
Rogers, Transparency in International Commercial Arbitration, Vol. 54 No. 5 
U. KANSAS L. REV. 1401 (2006). 
47 5 U.S.C. § 574(d); see also Grunewald, supra note 44, at 989. 
48 Grunewald, supra note 44, at 987–89 (1996); see generally, Rogers, supra 
note 46. 
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Transparency as a transcendent principle is surely 
to be commended.  The devil, though, typically tends to lurk 
in the details of implementation.  And greater light is often 
necessary to negotiate the dark.  For arbitration with 
government, light by example may be obtained from the 
broader implementation of arbitration—for example, 
modern international agreements employing arbitration for 
dispute resolution for international trade and investment 
agreements.49  These agreements commonly and specifically 
provide guidelines for maximizing transparency in 
arbitration.50  Moreover, transparency has become a 
 
49 See George A. Bermann, Regulatory Cooperation between the European 
Commission and U.S. Administrative Agencies, 9 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 933 
(1996). 
50 An example of a recent development of standards to ensure public 
accountability and transparency in arbitration are the transparency requirements 
developed for the investment settlement section of the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership Agreement that were developed for the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Agreement, stating as follows:   
 Article 9.24: Transparency of Arbitral Proceedings 
1. Subject to paragraphs 2 and 4, the respondent shall, after 
receiving the following documents, promptly transmit them to 
the non-disputing Parties and make them available to the 
public: 
a. The notice of intent; 
b. The notice of arbitration; 
c. Pleadings, memorials and briefs submitted to the tribunal 
by a disputing party and any written submissions 
submitted pursuant to Article 9.23.2 (Conduct of the 
Arbitration) and Article 9.23.3 and Article 9.28 
(Consolidation); 
d. Minutes or transcripts of hearings of the tribunal, if 
available; and 
e. Orders, awards and decisions of the tribunal 
Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, Chapter 9: Investment (Jan. 26, 2016), 
https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/about-us/who-we-are/treaties/trans-pacific-
partnership-agreement-tpp/text-of-the-trans-pacific-partnership. 
 The United Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based 
Investor-State Arbitration (the “Mauritius Convention on Transparency”) is 
another leading example of provision for transparency, particularly instructive 
in its detail.  UNCITRAL, Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based 
Investor-State Arbitration (New York, 2014) (the “Mauritius Convention on 
Transparency”) (Dec. 10, 2014), 
https://uncitral.un.org/en/texts/arbitration/conventions/transparency. The 
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predominant mandate for the implementation of 
international agreements through national law.51  
 
Convention incorporates the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-
based Investor-State Arbitration, 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/2014Transparenc
y.html.  These rules require the following publication of documents: 
 Article 3. Publication of documents 
1. Subject to article 7, the following documents shall be made 
available to the public:  the notice of arbitration, the response 
to the notice of arbitration, the statement of claim, the 
statement of defense and any further written statements or 
written submissions by any disputing party; a table listing all 
exhibits to the aforesaid documents and to expert reports and 
witness statements, if such table has been prepared for the 
proceedings, but not the exhibits themselves; any written 
submissions by the non-disputing Party (or Parties) to the 
treaty and by third persons, transcripts of hearings, where 
available; and orders, decisions and awards of the arbitral 
tribunal. 
2. Subject to article 7, expert reports and witness statements, 
exclusive of the exhibits thereto, shall be made available to the 
public, upon request by any person to the arbitral tribunal. 
3. Subject to article 7, the arbitral tribunal may decide, on its own 
initiative or upon request from any person, and after 
consultation with the disputing parties, whether and not to 
make available exhibits and any other documents provided to, 
or issued by the arbitral tribunal not falling within paragraphs 
1 or 2 above.  This may include, for example, making such 
documents available at a specified time. 
51 Thus, for example, the legislation for implementing the NAFTA agreement 
between the United States, Canada and Mexico specified the need to ensure ‘the 
fullest measure of transparency in the dispute settlement mechanism, to the 
extent consistent with the need to protect information that is classified or 
business confidential, by – (i) ensuring that all requests for dispute settlement, 
submissions, findings, and decisions are promptly made public; (ii) ensuring 
that all hearings are open to the public; and (iii) establishing a mechanism for 
acceptance of amicus curiae submissions from businesses, unions, and 
governmental organizations.’ Trade Act of 2002, 19 U.S.C. § 3802(b)(3)(H) 
(2002).  Bilateral Investment Treaties and Free Trade Agreements entered into 
by the United States post-NAFTA have accordingly required that the following 
documents be made available to the disputing Party(ies) and the public: the 
notice of intent to submit a clam to arbitration; the notice of arbitration; 
pleadings, memorials, and briefs submitted to the tribunal by any disputing 
party, non-disputing Party, or amicus curiae; minutes or transcripts of hearings 
of the tribunal, where available; and orders, awards and decisions of the 
tribunal; see, e.g., U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement, Art. 10.20, ¶ 1, 3–5.  
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Accordingly, bilateral Investment Treaties and Free Trade 
Agreements entered into by the United States have provided 
helpful reference points for developing and implementing 
critically important transparency.52   
 
III. DRAFTING THE AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE 
As the above qualifications of the conventional 
wisdom about arbitration indicate, the challenge for the 
government attorney is to assure that the choice to arbitrate 
will secure the advantages of arbitration, but not to the 
detriment of distinctly governmental objectives of public 
interest.53  The practical steps in meeting this challenge 
begin with drafting the arbitration agreement and 
establishing its scope.54   
The drafting may be designed to cover an entire 
contractual relationship, or particular disputes.55  It may be 
 
Canada has approved a similar and guidelines in Canada’s model Foreign 
Investment Protection Agreement issued in 2003; see Canada’s Model Foreign 
Investment Protection Agreement at Art. 38–39, 
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-
agreements/treaty-files/2820/download. 
52 Post-Nafta International Investment Agreements have included, for example, 
that “(T)he tribunal shall conduct hearings open to the public” U.S.-Chile Free 
Trade Agreement, Art. 10.20, ¶ 2, that the tribunal shall “have the authority to 
accept and consider amicus curiae submissions from a person or entity that is 
not a disputing party.”  U.S.–Chile Free Trade Agreement, Art. 10.19, ¶ 3 (June 
6, 2003); U.S.–Colombia Free Trade Agreement, Art. 10.20, ¶ 3 (May 15, 
2012); U.S.–Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, Art. 10.20, ¶ 3 (Apr. 12, 2006).  
Submissions in NAFTA and CAFTA–DR (The Dominican Republic–Central 
America FTA) as well as awards, can be found on the websites of the respective 
countries.  Hearings that can provide further enlightenment have been made 
public, either by closed-circuit TV or webcast. 
53 See generally, Rogers, supra note 46; Trade Act of 2002, 19 U.S.C. § 
3802(b)(3)(H) (2002); Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, Chapter 9: 
Investment (Jan. 26, 2016), https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/about-us/who-we-
are/treaties/trans-pacific-partnership-agreement-tpp/text-of-the-trans-pacific-
partnership; see also Grunewald, supra note 44. 
54 Blackaby, “Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration,” 6th ed., Oxford 
Univ. Press, 1–5, 35–39 (2015). 
55 Blackaby, supra note 54, at 35–38. 
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prospective, drafting the clause before a dispute has arisen, 
or for ad hoc arbitration after a dispute has arisen.56  
Draftsmanship is of the greatest importance, 
because what is most distinctive about arbitration as a 
modality of dispute resolution, is its most fundamental 
premise—party autonomy.57  That is, in contrast to judicial 
litigation, the parties choosing arbitration can control the 
entire dispute resolution process, by way of how the 
agreement to arbitrate is drafted.58  The parties can designate 
the scope of the tribunal’s jurisdiction.  They can designate 
the available remedies, including a cap or high-low range on 
the amount that can be awarded by the arbitrator.59  The 
entire substance and process is subject to the parties’ consent 
in establishing arbitration as the means for resolving their 
dispute.60  They can determine the substantive and 
procedural law that governs both the arbitration process and 
 
56 Blackaby, supra note 54. 
57 Karl-Heinz Bockstiegel, The Role of Party Autonomy in International 
Arbitration, 52 DISP. RESOL. J. 24, 25 (1997); ALAN REDFERN, LAW AND 
PRACTICE OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 135, 315 (Sweet & Maxwell, 4th ed. 
2004); Gordon Blanke, International Arbitration in EC Merger Control: A 
“Supranational” Lesson to be Learnt, EUR. COMPETITION L. REV., 324, 335–
36 (2006); Gus Van Harten & Martin Loughlin, Investment Treaty Arbitration 
as a Species of Global Administrative Law, 17 EUR. J. INT’L. L. 121, 140 
(2006); INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, THE AUTONOMY OF THE PARTIES 
IN INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS BETWEEN PRIVATE PERSONS OR ENTITIES 
(Basel Session 1991), https://www.idi-
iil.org/app/uploads/2017/06/1991_bal_02_en.pdf (characterizing party 
autonomy of arbitration as one of ‘the fundamental principles of private 
international law’).   
58 Bockstiegel, supra note 57, at 25;  REDFERN, supra note 57, at 315; Blanke, 
supra note 57, at 335–36; Van Harten & Loughlin, supra note 57, at 140; 
INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, supra note 57. 
59 See FindLaw Attorney Writers, Another Look at Remedies in Arbitration, 
FindLaw (Last Updated Apr. 29, 2016), 
https://corporate.findlaw.com/litigation-disputes/another-look-at-remedies-in-
arbitration.html. 
60 Bockstiegel, supra note 57, at 25;  REDFERN, supra note 57, at 315; Blanke, 
supra note 57, at 335–36; Van Harten & Loughlin, supra note 57, at 140; 
INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, supra note 57. 
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the merits of the dispute.61  This can include the utmost 
significant detail, such as, burden and standard of proof, the 
extent of disclosure, the nature and presentation of evidence, 
time limits, and decisions on weight and admissibility of 
evidence.62  The parties can choose that the substantive law 
governing the merits of the dispute will be differently 
sourced than the procedural law, or different from the 
procedural law and substantive law that will govern the 
arbitral process.63 
There are many choices to be made by the 
government lawyer in drafting the arbitration clause.  Should 
the arbitration be left ad hoc, to be agreed, if at all, once a 
dispute arises, or agreed as part of the greater deal?  Should 
arbitration be mandated to occur under the aegis of an 
arbitral institution and/or its rules?  That is, to what extent is 
it desirable to utilize an existing arbitral institution, which 
may be expensive, or maintain more robust and complete 
control over the procedural and substantive issues—though 
going it ad hoc is going it alone and may require reinventing 
the wheel and thereby heighten the risk of leaving out 
something important?  What should be the scope of the 
arbitration as to jurisdiction, including substantive issues?  
What should be the remedial authority of the arbitrator?  
Should a time frame and/or time limits be specified?  Should 
the parties empower the arbitrator to interpret or clarify its 
 
61 Bockstiegel, supra note 57, at 25;  REDFERN, supra note 57, at 315; Blanke, 
supra note 57, at 335–36; Van Harten & Loughlin, supra note 57, at 140; 
INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, supra note 57. 
62 Bockstiegel, supra note 57, at 25;  REDFERN, supra note 57, at 315; Blanke, 
supra note 57, at 335–36; Van Harten & Loughlin, supra note 57, at 140; 
INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, supra note 57. 
63 Bockstiegel, supra note 57, at 25;  REDFERN, supra note 57, at 315; Blanke, 
supra note 57, at 335–36; Van Harten & Loughlin, supra note 57, at 140; 
INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, supra note 57. 
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award?64  Should the arbitrator be authorized to resolve 
future related disputes between the parties?65   
Any one of these parameters may prove critical to 
sustaining an arbitral award.  If the tribunal exceeds the 
granted authority, by going beyond the designated 
jurisdiction and issues, any eventual award may be set aside 
or refused recognition and enforcement, as by way of article 
V(1)(a), (c) and (d) of the New York Convention governing 
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, and every well-
established arbitral system, domestic or international.66  This 
naturally follows from the principle of party autonomy, 
whereby it is the limits established by the parties that control.  
Each limit proposed in drafting the arbitration clause 
warrants close analysis as to its potential consequences.  
Potential abuse of process may be subtle and packaged as 
innocent.  This means, for arbitration involving government, 
that any parameter concerning scope of arbitration must be 
examined closely in reference to public policy and the 
pertinent governmental objectives.   
What is revealed in the case law, when there is 
neglect as to the drafting of the arbitration clause, is highly 
cautionary and instructive.  It is remarkable how commonly 
lawyers fail to consider potential consequences of provision 
for arbitration that must be recognized from the very outset 
of a contractual relationship.  Even in the performance of 
prestigious law firms and their highly compensated 
 
64 See J.G. MERRILLS, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 100 (Cambridge 
Univ. Press ed., 6th ed. 2017). 
65 In Rainbow Warrior, the arbitration ruling focused on creating a framework 
to regulate the parties’ future relationship and behavior.  Rainbow Warrior was 
a dispute between France and New Zealand that arose when an undercover 
French military operation sank a Dutch ship berthed in the Auckland Harbor. 
Rainbow Warrior Affair (N.Z. v. Fr.), 20 R.I.A.A. 215, 254 (Fr.–N.Z. Arb. 
Trib. 1990).  For further discussion, see MERRILLS, supra note 64, at 96–97, 
107. 
66 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards, June 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter New York Convention]. 
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attorneys, there is well-documented lack of awareness of the 
significance of the content of the arbitration clause or 
arbitration agreement—until it is too late.67  
Consider one example of this sort of lawyer 
negligence, where the lawyers left out just about everything, 
but were nevertheless compelled to arbitrate.  This was a 
significant governmental arbitration that took place in San 
Francisco, California, in the early 1980’s, concerning the 
very substantial matter of debt obligations of the then newly 
installed Sandinista government of Nicaragua.68  That 
government sought to compel arbitration of its expropriation 
of a fruit company, one of the U.S. enterprises that had 
previously dominated the Nicaraguan economy.69  Meeting 
in San Francisco, the lawyers on both sides of the dispute 
thought they had achieved a settlement.70  But the deal was 
never finalized, and contracts never executed.71  However, 
the lawyers had vaguely agreed to arbitrate disputes.72   
The agreement to arbitrate was wholly deficient, 
with virtually nothing specified.73  The lawyers couldn’t 
even remember the name of the London arbitration agency 
some of them thought they might use, so they didn’t 
designate an arbitral forum by name.74  Nevertheless, the 
U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting in San 
Francisco, determined that arbitration was required, on the 
basis of the strong United States federal policy in favor of 
arbitration, and the related so-called “separability 
doctrine.”75  That doctrine provides that though a contract 
may be held to be invalid or never even consummated, if 
 
67 New York Convention, supra note 66. 
68 Republic of Nicaragua v. Standard Fruit Co., 937 F.2d 469 (9th Cir. 1991). 
69 Nicaragua, 937 F.2d 469.  
70 Nicaragua, 937 F.2d 469.  
71 Nicaragua, 937 F.2d 469.  
72 Nicaragua, 937 F.2d 469.  
73 Nicaragua, 937 F.2d 469.  
74 Nicaragua, 937 F.2d 469.  
75 Nicaragua, 937 F.2d 469.  
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arbitration was agreed, arbitration will be treated as 
severable and enforceable.76   
That same “separability doctrine” is accepted in 
most national jurisdictions.77  Moreover under the widely 
established principle of Kompetenz–Kompetenz, a doctrine 
which many jurisdictions link as implied by the separability 
doctrine, it is for the arbitral tribunal itself to determine any 
question concerning validity of the arbitration clause or 
arbitration agreement.78   
 
76 GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 74–95 
(Wolters Kluwer ed., 2d ed. 2001). 
77 See, e.g., Cour de Cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] May 
7, 1973, Recueil Dalloz 1963, 545; Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] 
Feb. 24, 1994, 1997 XXII Y.B. Comm. Arb. 682l (“In international commercial 
arbitration, the principle of the autonomy of the arbitration agreement is a 
principle of general application, being an international substantive rule 
consecrating the legality of the arbitration agreement, beyond all reference to a 
system of conflict of laws.”); Corte di Appello [court of appeal] Bologna, 21 
December 1991, n. 1786 (It.) (“the arbitral clause is autonomous with respect 
to the contract – so that the nullity of the latter does not automatically affect the 
former”); Cass. 2 July 1981, n. 4279 (It.) (arbitration clause is “not affected by 
any nullity and, therefore bars the admissibility before the court, of an action 
aimed at having a contract declared null and void because its subject matter is 
unlawful”); Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Feb. 27, 1970, 
53 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESGERICHTSHOFES IN ZIVILSACHEN [BGHZ] 
315 (Ger.); Preliminary Award of 14 January 1982, 1986 XI Y.B. Comm. Arb 
97, 102 (“The Autonomy of an arbitration clause is a principle of international 
law that has been consistently applied in decisions rendered in international 
arbitrations, in the writings of the most qualified publicists on international 
arbitration, in arbitration regulations adopted by international organizations and 
in treaties”).  
78 Final Award in ICC Case No. 5294 of 22 February 1988, 1989 XIV Y.B. 
Comm. Arb. 137; Final Award in Case No. 3896 of 1982, 1985 X Y.B. 
Comm.Arb. 47; Final Award in Case No. 5485 of 18 August 1987, XIV Y.B. 
Comm. Arb. 156, 159 (1989) (“in international commercial arbitration the 
arbitrators have the authority to determine their own jurisdiction”); 
TOPCO/Calasiatic v. Libya, Nov. 27, 1975 Preliminary Award, reprinted in J. 
Gillis Wetter, The International Arbitral Process: Public and Private, 74 AM. 
J. INT’L. L. 441 (1979). See generally BORN, supra note 76; see also, J. Gillis 
Wetter, The Importance of Having A Connection, 3 ARB. INT’L. 329 (1987); 
Berthold Goldman, The Complementary Roles of Judges and Arbitrators in 
Ensuring That International Commercial Arbitration is Effective, SIXTY YEARS 
OF ICC ARBITRATION – A LOOK AT THE FUTURE 255, 263 (1984); STEPHEN 
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In light of the general inclination of the courts to 
defer to arbitration, it can be expected, particularly after an 
arbitration has come to judgment, that the competent court 
would be highly disinclined to nullify an arbitration 
provision, except in the most egregious case of the arbitral 
tribunal exceeding its evident jurisdiction, or having 
succumbed to one of the otherwise stated limited grounds for 
overturning an award, such as extortion or corruption.79  
Moreover once an arbitration has reached judgment and 
award, courts naturally are reluctant to nullify the arbitration 
provision.80  In other words, once you agree to arbitration, 
you are in all likelihood, stuck with it for the duration. 
Negligence in drafting the clause, as in the example 
just related, is all too common.81  When lawyers are 
negotiating an agreement, they focus on the deal, not the 
dispute resolution that might be engaged if the deal falls 
apart, notwithstanding that good lawyering requires 
evaluation of risk.82  Normally, so long as they are not 
thinking about arbitration, there really isn’t all that much to 
think about because the existing litigation system is a given.  
Lawyers, including government lawyers, naturally are 
inclined to assume the more familiar details and dynamics of 
the dispute resolution process of court litigation.  Because 
the parties and their lawyers intent on making the deal, not 
much may be thought or said about dispute resolution unless 
someone puts arbitration on the table.83  Even with that, 
 
SCHWEBEL, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: THREE SALIENT PROBLEMS 1-60 
(Cambridge Univ. Press ed., 3d ed, 1987). 
79 Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C §10 (2002).  
80 Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C §10 (2002).  
81 John M. Townsend, Drafting Arbitration Clauses Avoiding the 7 Deadly Sins, 
58–APR DISP. RESOL. J. 28 (February–April 2003). 
82 Negotiate to win, AMERICAN BAR ASS’N: FIRST FOCUS (October 2019), 
https://www.americanbar.org/news/abanews/publications/youraba/2019/octob
er-2019/pros-offer-constructive-tips-for-negotiating-/. 
83 Negotiate to win, supra note 82.  
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arbitration is often treated as a minor matter, an option, or 
often at best an afterthought.84   
Because the critical principle of arbitration is “party 
autonomy,” arbitration opens design of the dispute 
resolution process to the parties creating their own legal 
system.85  If the lawyer engaged in arbitration with the 
government doesn’t do the preparatory work required to 
secure his client’s interests in designing the arbitration, the 
lawyer will have missed a boat that has already sailed.  If the 
boat later sinks with the client’s cargo, the lawyer is poorly 
positioned to deny responsibility.  The truth of the matter is 
that when things go wrong, the arbitration clause, however 
ill-formed, may likely become the most important clause in 
the contract.  So it is imperative that the lawyers, especially 
government lawyers being charged with the public interest, 
do the necessary preparation when thinking of engaging 
arbitration; giving the most fulsome consideration to 
drafting the arbitral regime by way of the arbitration clause 
in all its critical aspects.  
For the government, some aspects may be so critical 
as to instruct against arbitration.  By agreeing to arbitration, 
the government lawyer risks waiving powers, defenses, or 
rights that are unique to the government.86  These powers, 
defenses, or rights must therefore be brought into focus 
before agreeing to arbitration.   
Most of all, it is essential for government lawyers to 
appreciate that the contractual adoption of an arbitration 
clause entirely preempts the issue of immunity.  In U.S. 
domestic law and in general in international arbitrations, an 
 
84 Larry P. Shiffer, Remedies for Arbitration Clause Impossibilities, CASETEXT 
(April 16, 2015), https://casetext.com/analysis/remedies-for-arbitration-clause-
impossiblities. 
85 Bockstiegel, supra note 57, at 25. 
86 Ryan Henry, Texas Supreme Court holds immunity waived for arbitration 
clauses, but only a court can decide the immunity question, LAW OFFICES OF 
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agreement to arbitrate is read broadly by courts as a waiver 
of any possible claim of immunity.87  The pendulum has 
swung so far in this direction that in 1988 the United States 
Congress passed a statute that specifically provides that if a 
government or government agency has agreed to arbitration, 
the agreement to arbitrate completely eliminates sovereign 
immunity from the dispute, whether as a defense or 
otherwise.88  The instruction, therefore, for a lawyer 
representing a government or government agency is: never 
agree to arbitration without fully assessing your potential 
claims for immunity or other special rights of government 
that may be thereby waived.   
 
IV. PUBLIC POLICY  
A. PARTY AUTONOMY 
Arbitration presents dire risks for governmental 
interests.  It is “party autonomy,” the foundational principle 
of arbitration, that carries this risk.   
 A government lawyer especially should be aware of 
the serious consequence of party autonomy in affecting the 
mindset of the arbitrator.  Arbitration is likely to be much 
less sensitive to the concerns of the government than 
litigation before a judge.89  This is because the social 
legitimacy of arbitration is based exclusively on the parties’ 
consent, not national sovereignty.90  For an arbitrator, the 
standard for decision-making is the contract.91  Judicial 
litigation, to the contrary, while considering the contract, 
makes primary the interests of the state and subordinate 
 
87 See BORN, supra note 76. 
88 For discussion of sovereign immunity in the realm of international arbitration, 
see generally Tai-Heng Cheng & Ivo Entchev, State Incapacity and Sovereign 
Immunity in International Arbitration, 26 SINGAPORE ACAD. L. J. 942 (2014). 
89 See generally Gary L. Benton, Arbitrators Are Not Judges, SILICON VALLEY 
ARBITRATION & MEDIATION CENTER (Jan. 4, 2018), 
https://svamc.org/arbitrators-are-not-judges/. 
90 Natalie Chaeva, Consent to Arbitration, JUS MUNDI (July 13, 2020) 
https://jusmundi.com/en/document/wiki/en-consent-to-arbitration. 
91 Hoffman, supra note 8. 
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values of the legal system and rule of law, particularly when 
the government is one of the parties.92  The arbitrator’s 
preoccupation is: what did the parties intend their contract to 
mean?  The litigation judge, on the other hand, is not just 
interpreting the contract, but is doing so guided by concerns 
of public policy reflected in statutory or regulatory law and 
the relevant corpus of adjudication, whether binding by stare 
decisis or as respected authority.93  The judge, as a 
government official, has the responsibility to secure the 
mandates of the law and the integrity of the official legal 
system.94  Yes, the judge looks to the intent of the parties, 
but gives priority to the mandates of the law with awareness 
that whatever he or she decides, that decision will fold into 
precedent for the future of society.95  The arbitrator is not 
bound by prior decisions, and normally is not concerned with 
instructing non-parties or even present parties for the 
future.96  The arbitrator’s focus is what is required for 
resolution of the instant case consistent with the express 
contractual intent of the parties.97  It is also true, however, 
that where multiple interests are involved, including those of 
non-parties, the arbitrator is better positioned to elicit those 
interests and craft orders that take into account the full 
collection of interests involved relative to the litigation judge 
confined by the need to rule on motions or judgment by the 
 
92 Hoffman, supra note 8. 
93 Hoffman, supra note 8. 
94 Code of Conduct for United States Judges, UNITED STATES COURTS (March 
12, 2019) https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/code-conduct-united-
states-judges. 
95 The Importance of Precedent, JAILHOUSE LAWYER’S HANDBOOK, 
http://jailhouselaw.org/the-importance-of-precedent/ (last visited March 3, 
2021). 
96 Paula Costa e Silva et al., Arbitral Precedent: Still Exploring the Path, 
KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Oct. 28, 2018) 
http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2018/10/28/arbitral-precedent-
still-exploring-the-path/. 
97 Hoffman, supra note 8. 
25
Garvey: Arbitration With Government
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2021
[Vol. 21: 281, 2021]                                     Arbitration With Government 
                                             PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL  
 
 306 
more purely adversarial structure of litigation.98  In this 
regard, arbitration can allow for greater input by the parties 
as to the workability of decision-maker results, particularly 
the more technical questions of implementation that may be 
involved.99  
 The litigation judge is also aware that any decision 
he or she renders is subject to reversal if found at odds with 
the letter or policies of the law.  In judicial litigation, the 
judge writes for other judges.  The judge is concerned with 
his or her institutional duty to the legal system, and perhaps 
above all, the very personal and professional concern not to 
be reversed.100  In that regard, judicial litigation has a more 
conservative inclination in its results.  The formality and 
procedural requirements of judicial litigation in comparison 
to arbitration also make it more likely that the litigation 
judge will be restrained by established norms than will the 
arbitrator, quite apart from the degree to which stare decisis 
may be controlling.101 
 The arbitrator, in contrast to the litigation judge, 
proceeds unencumbered by precedent, instructed by it, but 
not concerned about making it or following it, and relatively 
free to act contrary to established standards.  The arbitrator 
is accordingly freer to take on a quasi-legislative role and 
shape the dispute to the interests of the parties at hand.  The 
arbitrator, though distinguished from mediator by the power 
to dispose, can act as problem-solver vis-a-vis the parties.  
 
98 See generally Eugene J. Heady, What Will the Arbitrator’s Final Award Look 
Like?, SMITH CURRIE (May 9, 2014), 
https://www.smithcurrie.com/publications/common-sense-contract-law/what-
will-the-arbitrators-final-award-look-like/. 
99 See generally, Heady, supra note 98. 
100 Andrew Cohen, Influencing and Challenging Judges and Their Decisions in 




101 Annie Beersagel, Is There a Stare Decisis Doctrine in the Court of 
Arbitration for Sport? An Analysis of Published Awards for Anti-Doping 
Disputes in Track and Field, 12 DISP. RESOL. L.J. 189, 190 (2012).  
26
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The proactive litigation judge, especially in the common law 
system, is inclined to act, when the situation warrants, as 
policymaker within the law and for the most part, bound by 
established legality.  The arbitrator’s freedom to depart from 
established standards, and proceed untroubled by future 
policy, results because the arbitrator can act without fear of 
review of the merits, given the very narrow and limited 
grounds for reversal of an arbitral award, whether under U.S. 
arbitration law or international arbitration standards.102 
 This also results in the relative freedom of the 
arbitrator to ignore imperatives of public policy.  Arbitral 
rules include a public policy limitation on enforcement as 
declared, for example, in the New York Convention 
regarding enforcement of international arbitral awards and 
stated in virtually all arbitration regimes.103  But are such 
“public policy” limitations effective?  The actual record of 
arbitrations, both national and international, belies the 
effectiveness of public policy as a policing concept.  Public 
 
102 See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C §10 (2002) (Exemplifying the narrow 
grounds for review of an international arbitral award are the grounds stated in 
the New York Convention on Recognition and enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards now adopted by most other nations significantly engaged in 
international trade and investment, and which Brazil joined in 200); New York 
Convention, supra note 66 (Five defenses are found in Article V(1) and two in 
Article V(2).  The five Article V(1) defenses are (1) incapacity and invalidity, 
(2) lack of notice or fairness, (3) arbitrator acted in excess of authority, (4) the 
tribunal or the procedure was not in accord with the parties’ agreement, and (5) 
the award was not yet binding or had been set aside.  The two Article V(2) 
defenses are (1) lack of arbitrability and (2) violation of public policy.  The 
party resisting enforcement under any of the defenses has the burden of proof, 
though the two defenses in Article V(2) can also be raised by the court sua 
sponte.  Most notable in relation to appeal is that none of the defenses are based 
on the merits, and there is universal acknowledgment in national and 
international litigation that the defenses are to be narrowly construed.); see 
MARGARET L. MOSES, THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION 231–44 (Cambridge Univ. Press ed., 3d ed. 2017), for relevant 
summary of results, particularly under the New York Convention defenses.  
103 New York Convention, supra note 66.  
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policy is rarely invoked with success to prevent the 
rendering or enforcement of an arbitral award.104  
The consequence, therefore, of the party-autonomy 
principle of arbitration, as it plays out in arbitration and 
judicial review of arbitral awards, is that even the most 
significant public policy, even if embodied in the most 
significant substantive laws, can be sacrificed to arbitration.  
And to the present day, not only U.S. state and federal cases, 
but international adjudication of arbitral awards, instruct that 
public policy as a limitation on arbitration, is not much of a 
limitation at all.105  One reason for this is simply that 
burdened courts come to love arbitration as means to lighten 
their caseload.  Accordingly, they tend to read the 
arbitrator’s jurisdiction as broadly as possible, whatever 
might be implied from statutory or decisional law. 
Under the pro-arbitration policy of the FAA, 
arbitration will prevail also as to the procedural aspects of 
vindication of a federal or state right.  Thus, though 
enforcing a waiver of class arbitration leaves no economic 
incentive for claimants to pursue their rights through 
 
104 See, e.g., U.N. Commission on International Trade Law, UNCITRAL Model 
Law on International Commercial Arbitration, art. 34(3)(b)(ii), 
https://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/ml-arb/07-
86998_Ebook.pdf; China’s Civil Procedure Rules (allowing refusal of 
enforcement of foreign award that runs counter to social and public interests of 
the country). There are exceptional cases where public policy has been 
determinative; see Özmak Makina Ve Elektrik Anayi AS v. Voest Apline 
Industrieanlagenbau GmBH and anor, Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Supreme 
Court] Sept. 18, 2001, 4P_143/2001, 20 ASA Bulletin 311 (Switz.); Francelino 
da Silva Matuzalem v. Federation Internationale de Football Association 
(FIFA), [BGer] Mar. 27, 2012, 4A_558/2001 (Switz.) (holding that restriction 
of a person’s economic freedom violated public policy, because FIF banned the 
payer from all football-related activity until full amount of obligation to the 
organization was repaid). 
105 For a list of court decisions from countries reversing previous law to permit 
arbitration of contracts even where implicating antitrust issues, see REDFERN, 
supra note 57, at 165–68. 
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arbitration, the arbitration clause will be enforced as 
written.106  
Another reason the courts are inclined to read the 
jurisdiction of the arbitrator as broadly as possible is—as 
previously noted with respect to the admission of evidence—
that there is no deduction from the judge’s salary for the 
lesser work resulting from deferring to arbitration.  Because 
the litigation judge is paid by the state at a fixed salary no 
matter the lesser or greater his or her caseload, and the 
arbitrator bills by the hour or by the day, litigation judge and 
arbitrator working from the perspective of their own 
professional and economic interests are alike content with 
the broadest reading of arbitral jurisdiction, notwithstanding 
the enhanced risk that public policy will be ignored.  
The ostensible control by imposition of “public 
policy” is even less consequential at the enforcement stage 
of arbitration than when asserted as basis for “non-
arbitrability.”  Though most arbitration formulations provide 
for public policy or “good morals” as basis for non-
enforcement or annulment of an arbitral award, these 
doctrines are rarely employed, and rarely successful.107  In 
the critical and seminal case of Mitsubishi v. Soler,108 where 
 
106 The Supreme Court addressed such argument directly in the Italian Colors 
case, a case involving tension between the FAA and federal antitrust law, 
declaring that “the FAA’s command to enforce arbitration agreements trumps 
any interest in ensuring the prosecution of low-value claims.”  American 
Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, n.5 (2013).  
107 See, e.g., Laurie A. Tribble, Vacating Arbitrators’ Awards Under the Public 
Policy Exception: Are Courts Second-Guessing Arbitrators’ Decisions, 38 
VILL. L.R. 1051, 1055 (1993).   
108 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc., 473 U.S. 614 
(1985) [hereinafter Mitsubishi].  Mitsubishi was a joint venture by Chrysler 
International, S.A. (“CISA”), a Swiss corporation, and Mitsubishi Heavy 
Industries, Inc., a Japanese corporation.  Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. 
(“Soler”), the plaintiff, was a Puerto Rico corporation that sold automobiles, 
with its principal place of business in Pueblo Viejo, Guaynabo, Puerto Rico.  
Soler and CISA entered into a distributor agreement which provided for the sale 
of Mitsubishi automobiles, by Soler, within Puerto Rico.  Mitsubishi, CISA, 
and Soler entered into a sales agreement which provided for the sale of 
Mitsubishi products to Soler (for Soler to sell under the distributor agreement 
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the issue was arbitration of a dispute under the U.S. antitrust 
laws, the Supreme Court said the public policy mandate of 
the antitrust laws could be guaranteed because at the time the 
prevailing party would seek enforcement of the award, the 
reviewing court could check whether the U.S. antitrust laws 
had been taken into account by the arbitrator, and if not taken 
into account, could deny enforcement.109  But because an 
arbitral award is most often in the form of an amount of 
currency to be paid or a denial of any compensation, this 
 
terms).  The sales agreement included an arbitration clause that provided for all 
disputes under the agreement to be resolved by arbitration in Japan.  The sales 
agreement stated, “All disputes, controversies or differences which may arise . 
. . shall be finally settled by arbitration in Japan in accordance with the rules 
and regulations of the Japan Commercial Arbitration Association.”  Mitsubishi 
at 617.   
 Due to difficulties in the new car market, Soler sought to delay 
shipment of Mitsubishi products and to sell the Mitsubishi automobiles outside 
of Puerto Rico to meet its expected sales goals.  Mitsubishi and CISA 
disallowed shipment of the products by Soler outside of Puerto Rico and 
ultimately withheld shipments before bringing legal action.  Mitsubishi brought 
an action in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico to 
compel arbitration of several disputes under the agreement.  Soler 
counterclaimed and asserted causes of action under the Sherman Act, the United 
States federal antitrust law.  Soler alleged Mitsubishi and CISA violated the 
Sherman Act because they conspired to restrain free trade by dividing markets.  
Soler alleged Mitsubishi and CISA refused to sell ancillary products that would 
enable Soler to sell the automobiles outside of Puerto Rico and that Mitsubishi 
and CISA attempted to replace Soler with a wholly owned subsidiary as the 
exclusive Mitsubishi retailer in Puerto Rico.  Though Soler conceded that 
disputes of contract interpretation are generally arbitrable, Soler contended that 
the arbitration clause must specifically contemplate the arbitration of disputes 
arising out of statutes that were designed to protect the party resisting 
arbitration.  Mitsubishi at 620.   
109 The Supreme Court purported to afford protection for public policy in 
stating, "[h]aving permitted the arbitration to go forward, [U.S.] courts will 
have the opportunity at the award enforcement stage to ensure that the 
legitimate interest in the enforcement of the antitrust laws has been addressed.  
The Convention reserves to each signatory country the right to refuse 
enforcement of an award where the “recognition or enforcement of the award 
would be contrary to the public policy of that country.” Article V(2)(b).  While 
the efficacy of the arbitral process requires that substantive review at the award 
enforcement stage remain minimal, it would not require intrusive inquiry to 
ascertain that the tribunal took cognizance of the antitrust claims and actually 
decided them.”  Mitsubishi at 638.  
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claim of control is pure fiction.  How would a reviewing 
court determine whether a number or zero, the typical 
antitrust results, represents the arbitration having taken into 
account the antitrust laws?110  
In the past, many U.S. courts were inclined to 
reverse an arbitral award when there was so-called “manifest 
disregard of the law,” as might be the case for substantive 
law as important as the antitrust laws.111  “Manifest disregard 
of the law” could, in theory, leave an opening for the 
realization of public policy.112  However, “manifest 
disregard of the law” is no longer generally recognized as a 
valid objection to recognition and enforcement of an arbitral 
award.113  Indeed, there are typically no formal limits to 
prevent an arbitrator from making an error in choosing or 
interpreting the governing substantive law except as 
explicitly stipulated by the parties, and no limit in 
interpreting the law or applying the law to the facts.114  The 
arbitrator can even apply general principles of law that go 
beyond the law which a judge may apply.115   
For example, particularly in a commercial 
arbitration involving international parties, an arbitrator may 
recognize and apply general principles of international 
commercial law, so-called “lex mercatoria,” the “new law 
 
110 And of course, the arbitrator, now aware that the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
Mitsubishi decision could be a basis of reversal of his or her award if the 
antitrust laws are ignored, to protect the award can simply state in the award 
that the arbitration did take into account the antitrust laws.  Mitsubishi at 638. 
111 Michael H. LeRoy, Are Arbitrators Above the Law? The ‘Manifest 
Disregard of the Law’ Standard, 52, B.C. L. REV., 137, 137, (2011). 
112 See Michael H. LeRoy, supra note 111, at 137. 
113 Thus, in a case governing arbitration under federal law in the United States, 
the Supreme Court resolved a division between federal circuit courts when it 
held that judicial review of an arbitral award under the Federal Arbitration Act 
is limited to the narrow grounds listed in the statute; see Hall St. Assocs. v. 
Mattel Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 585 (2008).  
114 See Catherine A. Rogers, Fit and Function in Legal Ethics: Developing a 
Code of Conduct for International Arbitration, 23 MICH. J. INT’L L., 341, 414–
15 (2002) (stating “(e)ven clear mistakes of law in arbitral awards are virtually 
immune from appellate review.”). 
115 See Rogers, supra note 114, at 415. 
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merchant,” or “transnational law.”116  This may be to the 
advantage of the government attorney when there is risk that 
the matter at hand may be subject to the jurisdiction of a 
foreign state and its adverse principles, even to the point 
where the government attorney may wish to negotiate a 
stipulation that such general principles rather than national 
laws will be applied.   
But it is also necessary for the government attorney 
to keep in mind that any reference to such “general 
principles,” given their generality, is inherently an invitation 
to the expansion of the arbitral tribunal’s flexibility and 
discretion in the exercise its power.117  This presents another 
potential to undermine the public interests with which the 
government is charged, and therefore cautions adoption of 
general principles as absolving the agreement of risk.  
Moreover, notwithstanding this risk of reference to ill-
defined general principles, judicial approval can generally be 
expected to follow given the contemporary presumptive 
validity of arbitration for its value in achieving expeditious 
finality.118   
There is a complex of reasons why judges are 
inclined to leave it all to arbitration, despite what may be 
their better instincts for protecting the public interest.  This 
inclination effectively opens the way for arbitrators to 
maximize their exercise of power.  Most importantly, the 
grounds for review and reversal of an arbitral award are so 
limited, and the inclination of judiciaries to avoid any review 
on the merits so strong, that the ultimate result of party 
autonomy and independence of the arbitrator is that the 
 
116 For example, “[t]he Brazilian arbitration law allows the use of national rules, 
non-national rules, general principles of law, uses and customs, and 
international rules of commerce for resolving the dispute.”  Savio R. Sordi, 
Tatiana de Almeida F.R. Cardoso Squeff, The Introduction of Arbitration 
Within the Brazilian Legal Context, 4 PANOR. BRAZ. LAW 306, 320, (2016). 
117 Philip McConnaughay, The Risks and Virtues of Lawlessness: A “Second 
Look” at International Commercial Arbitration, 93 NW. L. REV. 453, 471 
(1999). 
118 See Hall St. Assocs., 552 U.S. at 587. 
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arbitrator is seated at the head of the table as the proverbial 
“500-pound gorilla.”119  The arbitrator is a 500-pound gorilla 
because the arbitrator need not worry about reversal on the 
basis of public policy, or any argument grounded in the 
merits, so as long as there is no demonstrable bias, offense 
to due process, or lack of jurisdiction—all rarely successful 
grounds for reversal or nullification of an arbitral award.120  
The instruction, therefore, for a lawyer representing 
government or its agencies is that by choosing arbitration 
over judicial litigation, that lawyer runs a significant risk that 
public policy or “good morals” will fall outside the purview 
of the arbitrator, who is focused primarily and most often 
exclusively on what the parties intended by their contract.  
There is thus good reason to be cautious about adopting 
arbitration.  If the dispute importantly concerns public policy 
of the state rather than simply contractual rights, the 
government lawyer must beware of the arbitrator.  The 
arbitrator is less likely than the judge to pay heed to the 
remedial and deterrence functions of the law, and less likely 
to seek to deter conduct that is inimical to the public good.121   
Presumably, negotiating the requirement for a so-
called “reasoned award” can serve to assure adherence to the 
law and its public policy mandate.122  A potential antidote to 
the uncontrolled discretion of the arbitrator is to require the 
 
119 See Hall St. Assocs., 552 U.S. at 587. 
120 Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C §10 (2002); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 128.6 
(West, current through Ch. 372 of 2020 Reg. Sess.). 
121 For example, in a labor dispute the arbitrator is less likely than the judge to 
rule in a manner to put employees or employers outside the arbitration on notice 
of correct behavior.  The arbitrator is also less likely to act to prevent future 
public law violations; see Gary Spitko, Federal Arbitration Act Preemption of 
State Public-Policy-Based Employment Arbitration Doctrine: An Autopsy and 
an Argument for Federal Agency Oversight, 20 HARV. NEGOT. L.R. 1 (2015). 
122 See Types of Final Arbitration Awards: Why the Choice Matters, STRADLEY 
RONON (Feb. 2020), https://www.stradley.com/-
/media/files/publications/2020/02/adr-advisor--february-2020.pdf. 
33
Garvey: Arbitration With Government
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2021
[Vol. 21: 281, 2021]                                     Arbitration With Government 
                                             PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL  
 
 314 
arbitrator to include the arbitrator’s elucidation of its 
reasoning with the award.123   
No doubt the requirement for statement of reasons 
does provide inhibition for the arbitrator.124  Knowing one’s 
reasoning will be scrutinized surely encourages rational and 
objective analysis, if for no other reason than the arbitrator’s 
personal concern to maintain a reputation of integrity and 
competence.125  No doubt the requirement of statement of 
reasons is also a significant consideration in ensuring 
objectivity.126  Even apart from the reputational concern for 
integrity and competence of the arbitrator, this dynamic is 
enhanced by the promise of more business for the arbitrator 
perceived by prospective parties on both sides of a case as 
fair, objective, and competent.  In that the appointment of an 
arbitrator depends on the consent of both sides, this is one 
respect in which arbitration can be markedly superior to 
adjudicative process, considering that judges in the formal 
legal system who gain office by election or appointment are 
less dependent on reputation for competence.   
However, even the stipulation for a “reasoned 
award” does not serve as an ultimate or absolute constraint 
on the power of the arbitrator to ignore public policy.127  That 
is because most, if not all, arbitral systems posit the 
discretion of the arbitrator to act ex aequo et bono, i.e., to 
exercise equitable discretion.128  This is not only for arbitral 
systems involving government with the private sector or 
operating under domestic law but also in international 
arbitration that includes governments and their agencies.129  
Particularly in international arbitrations involving 
 
123 See Types of Final Arbitration Awards, supra note 122. 
124 See Types of Final Arbitration Awards, supra note 122. 
125 See infra Section E. 
126 See Types of Final Arbitration Awards, supra note 122. 
127 See Jaque I. Garvey, Arbitration Involving Governmental Entities, REVISTA 
ELETRÔNICA DA PROCURADORIA GERAL DO ESTADO DO RIO DE JANEIRO, 14 
(2018). 
128 Garvey, supra note 127.  
129 MERRILLS, supra note 64, at 158, 160–61. 
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governments, ex aequo et bono is there, being valued as 
assuring the flexibility of decision to frame a result as “fair” 
for both parties.130  The arbitrator is not required to designate 
winners and losers, as court litigation is ostensibly, if not 
practically, designed to achieve.  Such discretion of the 
arbitrator is also valued as providing the flexibility to adjust 
to changed circumstance and make provision to avoid future 
conflict.131   
If not rigidly referenced to certain legal standards 
by consent of the parties, there is ultimately no guarantee to 
insulate arbitration from the exercise of equitable discretion 
to ignore public policy, whatever the rationalization offered 
in the award.132  Ultimately, the limits on review are again 
what is critical.133  Arbitrators universally render their 
awards with full awareness that their awards cannot be 
reviewed and reversed on the merits.134  It is the very nature 
of arbitration to provide this assurance; the assurance of no 
review on the merits being what distinguishes arbitration as 
providing greater and more expeditious finality than judicial 
litigation, or negotiation, or mediation.135   
The tension between the arbitrator’s equitable 
powers and the requirement of a reasoned award as a saving 
grace for arbitration cannot be eliminated.136  Ex aequo et 
bono is there, alive and well, and as a more threatening and 
pervasive uncertainty than in litigation.137  The arbitrator’s 
subjective sense of equity can determine the admission of 
evidence, the cross-examination of witnesses, the 
examination of documents, and most importantly, the 
 
130 Garvey, supra note 127.  
131 See, e.g., Rainbow Warrior Affair, 20 R.I.A.A. at 254. 
132 See Judicial Exercise of Equitable Discretion in Enforcement of Arbitration 
Contracts, 21 U. CHI. L. REV. 719 (1954). 
133 See Garvey, supra note 127.  
134 See Garvey, supra note 127.  
135 Garvey, supra note 127.  
136 McConnaughay, supra note 117, at 460 (relating the goals for proper award 
and values).  
137 McConnaughay, supra note 117, at 470. 
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result.138  In arbitration, ex aequo et bono is not within the 
discretion of a judge subject to judicial review, but simply 
and finally, ‘equity’ is within the absolute discretion of a 
500-pound gorilla.139   
 
B. POLITICAL DEFLECTION  
In general, the more significant the public policy 
interest involved in a dispute, the less likely a government 
lawyer will be or should be inclined to agree to arbitration—
or, indeed, to any third-party neutral dispute resolution 
process.140  One technique to still enjoy the benefits of 
arbitration in matters of governmental significance, if it can 
be accomplished, is to break up the dispute into its 
components, resolving the lesser with arbitration and the 
greater with negotiation or another mode of dispute 
resolution.141  But the smartest strategy, in the right case of 
high profile governmental interest, may be quite the 
contrary—to adopt arbitration for resolution of the entire 
dispute.142  This is a strategy that could be best described as 
“political deflection.”  The right dispute for this strategy is 
when, as the colloquialism expresses it, “the dispute is too 
hot for diplomacy to handle.”143   
Consider two examples from international 
arbitration: First, the arbitration between Israel and Egypt 
concerning jurisdiction over the Taba area on the coast of the 
 
138 McConnaughay, supra note 117, at 470.  
139 McConnaughay, supra note 117, at 460, 70. 
140 McConnaughay, supra note 117, at 486.  
141 For example, in the Torres Strait dispute, a maritime delimitation between 
Australia and Papua New Guinea, the arbitral tribunal approached the dispute 
resolution process by splitting the issues and separating out items for 
negotiation.  For further discussion, see MERRILLS, supra note 64, at 160–61. 
142 MERRILLS, supra note 64. 
143 MERRILLS, supra note 64, at 160–61; Richard Bernstein, World Court Settles 
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Sinai Peninsula,144 and second, the “Georges Bank” dispute 
over fishing rights on the adjoining coasts of Canada and the 
United States.145  Both were situations where the dispute was 
so hotly loaded with the economic and political interests of 
domestic constituencies that diplomacy was not likely to 
succeed.  For the case of Taba, given the history of the 
conflict, the symbolic significance of any conflict of 
jurisdiction between Israel and Egypt was potentially too 
great for diplomatic resolution.146  For the Georges Bank 
Arbitration, which concerned on the one side the Canadian 
fishermens’ interests, and the other the United States 
fishermens’ interests, a concession by either side would have 
been viewed as a betrayal of its fishermen.147  In both Taba 
and the Georges Bank, even if any diplomatic compromise 
could be achieved, it inevitably would have left the 
respective domestic constituencies blaming their 
government for failure to adequately vindicate their rights.148  
But by moving the matter to the neutral third party process 
that arbitration affords, the governments of Israel, Egypt, 
Canada, and the United States, in response to any result less 
than 100%, could all proclaim to their domestic constituents, 
“we did the best we could. It was the arbitrator who failed to 
fully vindicate your rights.”149   
It is thus that arbitration can be utilized as an escape 
from political accountability—but surely not to be 
condemned when the objective for all is successful dispute 
resolution.  For the government lawyer, the resolution of the 
dispute to serve the relationships involved, whether between 
 
144 MERRILLS, supra note 64, at 100 (discussing the issues the international 
tribunal was asked to decide and the lack of guidance of the tribunal). 
145 Bernstein, supra note 143 (noting the dispute was decided by a five-judge 
panel drawn entirely from Western democracies that based its decision largely 
on technical and geographic grounds and rejected the U.S. and Canadian 
historical ties arguments). 
146 MERRILLS, supra note 64, at 100.  
147 Bernstein, supra note 143.  
148 Bernstein, supra note 143; MERRILLS, supra note 64, at 100. 
149 McConnaughay, supra note 117, at n.74.  
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nations or other governmental entities, or the government 
and a private party, on any of a variety of possible terms, 
may be more important than the terms of the award.150  If the 
political deflection that arbitration provides for the primary 
benefit of all parties is what it takes, so be it.   
 
V. ARBITRATION AND CONFLICTING PUBLIC 
POLICY 
A. FEDERAL PUBLIC POLICY 
U.S. federal law does include ostensible constraints 
on the use of arbitration where important federal public 
policy is at issue.151  The FAA provides that Arbitration will 
not be used whenever: 
(1) A definitive or authoritative 
resolution of the matter is required for 
precedential value, and such a proceeding 
is not likely to be accepted generally as an 
authoritative precedent; 
(2) The matter involves or may bear 
upon significant questions of 
Governmental policy that require 
additional procedures before a final 
resolution may be made, and such a 
proceeding would not likely serve to 
develop a recommended policy for the 
agency; 
(3) Maintaining established policies is 
of special importance, so that variations 
among individual decisions are not 
increased and such a proceeding would not 
 
150 Spitko, supra note 121, at 40. 
151 The U.S. Federal Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1996 similarly 
provides that arbitration should not be used when: (1) precedent is required; (2) 
there are “significant questions of Government policy”; (3) “maintaining 
established policies is of special importance” (4) “the matter significantly 
affects persons or organizations who are not parties to the proceeding” (5) “a 
full public record of the proceeding is important” and (6) “the agency must 
maintain continuing jurisdiction over the matter[.]” 5 U.S.C. § 572 (1990). 
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likely reach consistent results among 
individual decisions; . . . 152 
Reflected in these standards is not only public 
policy concern, but also concern about arbitration’s flouting 
of stare decisis.153  One arbitral result may be predictive or 
instructive as to another, but any given arbitration cannot, by 
force of decision, create a body of public contract law that 
other arbitration panels will necessarily follow, or even 
purport to follow, or see as even bound to distinguish.154  
Accordingly, if it is in the client’s interest to rely on 
precedent, that is reason to prefer litigation to arbitration.155  
This also means that in pre-arbitration, if arbitration is to be 
the mode of dispute resolution, the parties are less able to 
evaluate their chances of success than in judicial 
litigation.156  The prospects of settlement are consequently 
less as the parties are less able to evaluate, pre-arbitration, 
their chances for success and achieve a predictable basis for 
compromise.157   
The U.S. Congress, of course, has the power to 
exempt claims arising under any statute from the FAA’s pro-
arbitration policy.158  But Congress has rarely shown any 
such inclination, and the United States Supreme Court has 
been adverse to finding any such mandate.159   
This was dramatically demonstrated at the federal 
level with respect to the United States antitrust laws—laws 
that the U.S. Supreme Court has referred to as the nation’s 
“Charter of Economic Liberty.”160  Given the importance 
and grounding of the antitrust laws as fundamental economic 
 
152 5 U.S.C. § 572 (1990). 
153 See 5 U.S.C. § 572 (1990).  
154 See 5 U.S.C. § 572 (1990).  
155 See 5 U.S.C. § 572 (1990).  
156 See 5 U.S.C. § 572 (1990).  
157 See 5 U.S.C. § 572 (1990).  
158 Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, n. 5 (2013). 
159 Spitko, supra note 121, at 3, n. 1. 
160 New Motor Vehicle Bd. of Cal. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 436 U.S. 954 (1978); 
N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958). 
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doctrine for the United States prior to the U.S. Supreme 
Court addressing the matter of arbitration of the antitrust 
laws, most commentators thought implementation of the 
antitrust laws to be off-limits for domestic arbitration.161  
This is especially true for international arbitration, which 
would risk removing public policy control completely from 
the jurisdiction of the United States.162  But after 
international arbitration was deemed to be legitimately 
advantageous in a broad range of U.S. federal statutory 
areas, including the securities laws163 and labor laws,164 there 
came the big test the arbitration community was waiting 
for—arbitration of antitrust—where U.S. policy was 
uniquely firm and extreme compared with most other 
nations.   
The case that ultimately tested arbitration against 
the concern that it could undermine antitrust policy was the 
case filed against the Mitsubishi Automobile Corporation, a 
Japanese corporation with its principal place of business in 
Tokyo, Japan, concerning its franchise operation in Puerto 
Rico.165  The plaintiff distributor sought protection under the 
U.S. antitrust laws.166   
The prevalent view before the Mitsubishi decision was 
rendered—on whether the antitrust laws could be trusted to 
 




162 McConnaughay, supra note 117, at 485. 
163 Diana B. Henriques, When Naivete Meets Wall Street, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 
1989), https://www.nytimes.com/1989/12/03/business/when-naivete-meets-
wall-street.html (explaining the use of arbitration in securities disputes and the 
relative leverage held by investors and brokers as a result). 
164 Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking the Deck of 
Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/business/dealbook/arbitration-
everywhere-stacking-the-deck-of-justice.html (discussing the use of arbitration 
clauses in employment contracts and the long-run impact on employees). 
165 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc., 473 U.S. 614 
(1985). 
166 Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. 614. 
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arbitration—was that because the antitrust laws are designed 
to promote and protect competition, and the United Sates has 
a fundamental interest in enforcing its antitrust laws to 
maintain a competitive position in the world market, 
arbitration would not be allowed.167  Moreover, the thinking 
was that because arbitration is based on the autonomy of 
private parties to design and control both process and 
substance, it is vulnerable to the inordinate leverage the 
antitrust laws are purposed to prohibit, and therefore 
arbitration would not serve adequately to provide deterrence 
of potential antitrust violations.  
The United States Supreme Court, addressing these 
concerns, nevertheless declared the provision for foreign 
arbitration in Japan valid and enforceable, much to the 
surprise of the international arbitration community.168  It 
disposed of two principal contentions that the antitrust 
dispute was nonarbitrable.169  First, the court considered 
whether the scope of the U.S. federal Arbitration Act 
imposes a presumption of nonarbitrability of claims arising 
under statutes that are not specifically mentioned in the 
parties’ agreement.170  Second, the U.S. Supreme Court 
considered whether the public interest in enforcing U.S. 
antitrust laws was so paramount as to render antitrust 
disputes nonarbitrable.171   
Interpreting the scope of the FAA broadly, the Court 
held that the Act does not imply a general presumption 
against arbitration of statutory claims; quite the opposite. It 
declared that the Court has a duty to “rigorously enforce 
agreements to arbitrate” because Congress’s primary intent 
in enacting the FAA was to enforce private parties’ 
 
167 Richard Levin, On Arbitration of Competition/Antitrust Disputes: A Tribute 
to Mitsubishi, 73 DISP. RESOL. J. 4, 39 (2019), 
https://richardlevinarbitration.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/On-
Arbitration-of-Competition-Antitrust-Disputes-June-19.pdf. 
168 Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. 614. 
169 Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628, 640. 
170 Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. 614. 
171 Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 629. 
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agreements to arbitrate, and that doubts concerning whether 
issues are arbitrable are to be resolved in favor of 
arbitration.172  The Court allowed only that a clear 
congressional statement of intent could be the basis to 
determine that issues under federal law are non-arbitrable, 
given the FAA and its categorical pro-arbitration mandate. It 
concluded the United States Congress had not evidenced any 
such intent, anywhere, to limit the broad scope of arbitration 
in relation to the application of the U.S. anti-trust laws.173   
In this respect the decision was somewhat myopic, given 
the longevity of the antitrust laws, and their origination long 
before arbitration was legislated as national policy in the 
FAA.174  But the analysis and the result in Mitsubishi does 
demonstrate how far the Court was willing to go to support 
arbitration despite the countervailing public interests 
embodied in statutory embodiment of federal public policy 
in the antitrust laws or any other federal statute.175 
 
172 Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 626. 
173 Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 627–28.  
174 Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C §10 (2002). 
175 In considering whether the significant public interest in enforcing U.S. 
antitrust laws renders such disputes categorically unsuitable for arbitration, the 
Court further concluded that international trade interests took precedence over 
the public policy interests in enforcing U.S. antitrust law.  Thus, it concluded, 
there was no need to consider the categorical arbitrability of antitrust, declaring, 
“[C]oncerns of international comity, respect for the capacities of foreign and 
transnational tribunals, and sensitivity to the need of the international 
commercial system for predictability in the resolution of disputes require that 
we enforce the parties’ agreement, even assuming that a contrary result would 
be forthcoming in a domestic context.” Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 629. The Court 
cited two earlier cases that involved the securities regulation statutes, also 
constituting a body of law embodying significant public policy interest. (The 
Court compared Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974) and Wilko 
v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).)  The earlier case, Wilko had concerned 
securities regulation in a domestic context, and the Supreme Court held the 
alleged securities law violations non-arbitrable. The latter case Scherk, 
involving an international securities regulation dispute, was held to be 
arbitrable. The Court reasoned similarly for its determination in Mitsubishi that 
predictability of dispute resolution from contractual forum selection clauses is 
imperative for international business dealings. In so doing it reflected the 
similar view based in economics of international trade that the U.S. antitrust 
laws are “designed to promote the national interest in a competitive economy.” 
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B. STATE PUBLIC POLICY AND THE 
FEDERAL/STATE CONFLICT 
After passage of the FAA in 1996, there developed 
a substantial jurisprudence of conflict between state and 
federal law.176  On the one hand, there was state legislation 
and adjudication overriding arbitration clauses deemed 
inimical to state public policy.177  On the other was the pro-
arbitration policy of the FAA as applied by the Supreme 
Court of the United States to override state public policy.178   
Unlike the analysis of conflict between the policy of 
the FAA and other federal statutes where the issue is their 
relative scope, when the issue amounts to conflict between 
state public policy and the FAA, the issue was, and is, federal 
preemption—whether state policy is trumped by the pro-
arbitration mandate of the FAA.179  This conflict with state 
law has become particularly acute as the expansion of 
arbitration has expanded the efforts of companies to employ 
arbitration clauses in their contracts to target costly or 
embarrassing challenges to their power.180   
 
Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 635. It acknowledged that private causes of action, 
particularly through the treble damages remedy, play an important role in 
enforcing antitrust, but reasoned that the choice to arbitrate disputes does not 
forgo substantive rights afforded by statutes, but only trades the procedural 
opportunities for review of a court opinion for the expediency of arbitration, 
and that so long as private parties effectuated their intent to be that the arbitral 
body would decide claims arising under the U.S. antitrust laws, the tribunal 
should be bound to decide the claims in accordance with those laws. Therefore, 
the Court reasoned, arbitration serves both remedial and deterrent functions. It 
concluded that a minimally intrusive review of the arbitration decision should 
be sufficient to ascertain the tribunal acknowledged and decided on the antitrust 
claims. Id. at 638.  
176 Robert Hollis et al., Is State Law Looking for Trouble: The Federal 
Arbitration Act Flexes Its Preemptive Muscle, 2003:2 J. DISP. RESOL. 1 (2003), 
https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/217049943.pdf. 
177 Hollis, supra note 176.  
178 Hollis, supra note 176. 
179 Hollis, supra note 176. 
180 Abigail Abrams, 81 of the Largest U.S. Companies Won’t Let You Take 
Them to Court, TIME, (Feb. 27, 2019 9:00AM) 
https://time.com/5538028/consumer-arbitration-agreements/. 
43
Garvey: Arbitration With Government
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2021
[Vol. 21: 281, 2021]                                     Arbitration With Government 
                                             PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL  
 
 324 
The conflict extends to all sectors of the economy, 
most especially to areas such as consumer rights, rights of 
labor, and environmental concerns, often highlighting gross 
disparities of economic power between commercial entities 
and their workers or clients.181  Arbitration has become a 
flashpoint of high-profile social conflict.182  Examples 
include the use of arbitration clauses to stifle consumer 
litigation rights, including waivers of the right to join in a 
class action or the use of arbitration clauses and related 
assurances of confidentiality such as non-disclosure 
agreements to insulate employers against claims of sexual 
harassment in the workplace.183  
The clash between the FAA and state public policy 
is probably most evident in the repeated clash between the 
U.S. Supreme Court interpreting the FAA as broadly 
preemptive, and the California legislature and California 
courts trying to articulate exceptions in the interest of 
California’s public policies.184  Indeed, the principal FAA 
 
181 Abrams, supra note 180. 
182 Abrams, supra note 180. 
183 Abrams, supra note 180. 
184 See, e.g., Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005) 
(holding that class action waivers should not be enforced under a multi-factor 
test and effectively ignoring the Supreme Court’s holding in Concepcion that 
the FAA preempted California’s Discover Bank rule and required absolutely 
that contractual waiver of class actions could not be regulated by California);  
Gentry v. Superior Court, 165 P.3d 556, 599 (Cal. 2007) (holding that “class 
arbitration waivers should not be enforced if, the trial court determines, based 
on certain factors . . . that class arbitration would be a significantly more 
effective way of vindicating the rights of affected employees than individual 
arbitration.”).  These rulings were despite the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
determination in Concepcion that the FAA prohibits states from conditioning 
the enforceability of arbitration agreements on the availability of classwide 
arbitration procedures.  AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 
1744 (2011); see also Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Third Arbitration Trilogy, 
Stolt-Nielsen, Rent-A-Center, Concepcion, and the Future of American 
Arbitration, 22 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 323 (2011);  Broughton v. Cigna 
Healthplans of Cal., 988 P.2d 67 (Cal. 1999) (holding claims for public 
injunctive relief under the California Consumer Legal Remedies Act not subject 
to arbitration); Cruz v. PacifiCare Health Sys., Inc., 66 P.3d 1157 (Cal. 2003) 
(extending Broughton to include claims to enjoin unfair competition under 
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preemption cases have concerned challenges under the FAA 
to California statutory or case law.185  Unlike cases of 
apparent conflict between the FAA and other federal 
statutes, where a federal statute might be deemed sufficiently 
clear and conclusive as prohibiting arbitration,186 where the 
conflict is between the FAA’s pro-arbitration policy and 
state law, the United States Supreme Court has uniformly 
ruled in favor of FAA preemption of state public policy, 
under the FAA187 and the Supremacy Clause of the United 
States Constitution.188  The U.S. Supreme Court’s 2011 
 
California’s Unfair Competition Law and claims to enjoin false advertising 
under California Business and Professions Code Section 17500);  Stephen A. 
Broome, An Unconsciounable Application of the Unconsciounability Doctrine: 
How the California Courts Are Circumventing the Federal Arbitration Act, 3 
HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 39 (2006). 
185 See Discover Bank, 113 P.2d at 1110;  Gentry, 165 P.3d at 599;  Concepcion, 
131 S.Ct. at 1744;  Broughton, 988 P.2d at 67;  Cruz, 66 P.3d at 1157.  
186 Spitko, supra note 121 at, at 8–9;  Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637–638. 
187 The key provision of the FAA on which preemption is based is Section 2, 
declaring as its foundational principle that, “A written provision in . . . a contract 
evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a 
controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal 
to perform the whole or any part thereof . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and 
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the 
revocation of any contract.”  9 U.S.C §2 (1947). 
188 See AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011) 
(holding that the FAA preempts California's judicially-created “Discover 
Bank” rule classifying as unconscionable most consumer contract collective-
arbitration waivers);  Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 359 (2008) (holding that 
the FAA preempts the section of the California Talent Agencies Act vesting in 
the California Labor Commissioner exclusive original jurisdiction over claims 
arising under the act); Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Leland Stanford Univ., 489 U.S. 
468, 470, 479 (1989) (holding that the FAA does not preempt a provision of the 
California Arbitration Act allowing a court to stay arbitration pending 
resolution of related litigation if the parties have agreed that the provision shall 
govern their arbitration); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 491–92 (1987) 
(holding that the FAA preempts the section of the California Labor Code 
providing that an action to collect wages may proceed notwithstanding an 
agreement to arbitrate);  Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984) 
(holding that the FAA preempts the section of the California Franchise 
Investment Law requiring judicial consideration of claims brought under the 
California statute).  
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decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion and the 
Court’s 2013 decision in American Express Co. v. Italian 
Colors Restaurant are characteristic as consistently in favor 
of arbitration.189  These cases make clear that neither state 
substantive policies nor procedural requirements of state law 
are allowed to impair “the enforcement of arbitration 
agreements according to their terms so as to facilitate 
streamlined proceedings.”190  The California Supreme 
Court, for example, attempted to carve out an exception from 
preemption where enforcement of a private right is designed 
as a substitute for action brought by the government, as 
under California’s “Labor Code Private Attorneys General 
Act of 2004.”191  The suit was in the nature of a private 
attorney general action in that it was by an employee, but 
also on behalf other current or former employees.192  The 
United States Supreme Court categorically rejected such 
exception.193 
Notwithstanding the chain of rulings by the U.S. 
Supreme Court supporting federal preemption, the effort to 
break the chain in favor of state public policy has continued 
unabated, most notably by the legislature of California and 
California courts.194  In 2020, a U.S. district judge enjoined 
California officials from enforcing a new law that was to bar 
employers from requiring workers, as condition of their 
employment, to waive “any right, forum or procedure” for 
 
189 American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 133 S.Ct. 2304 (2013); 
Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740 (2011). 
190 Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. at 1748. 
191 CAL. LAB. CODE §§2698–2699.5 (West 2004). 
192 Iskanian v. CLS Transp. Los Angeles, L.L.C., 327 P.3d 129 (Cal. 2014), 
cert. denied, 135 S.Ct. 1155 (2015); Arias v. Superior Court, 209 P.3d 923, 932 
(Cal. 2009);  Brown v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 128 Cal. Rptr. 3d 854 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2011), cert. denied, 566 U.S. 937 (2012).  For critique of the California 
Supreme Court’s holding in Iskanian and other cases standing for the exception, 
see Spitko, supra note 121, at 35–43.  
193 Iskanian, 327 P. 3d; Ralphs Grocery Co., 128 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 
194 Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Becerra, 438 F. Supp. 3d 1078, 1108 (E.D. 
Cal. 2020). 
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resolving employment disputes.195  The law would have 
imposed civil and misdemeanor criminal penalties on 
employers who required workers to agree to procedural 
limitations on their ability to enforce employment rights.196  
The California legislation explicitly provided that it was not 
intended to invalidate arbitration agreements that are 
otherwise enforceable under the FAA.197  Nevertheless, a 
federal court found that California Assembly Bill 51 is 
preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) because it 
“singles out arbitration by placing uncommon barriers on 
employers who require contractual waivers of dispute 
resolution options that bear the defining features of 
arbitration.”198  Assembly Bill 51 was deemed to be invalid 
for placing arbitration agreements on “unequal footing” as 
compared to other contracts.199 
The pertinent academic literature includes various 
proposals for the realization of state public policy to avoid 
the broadly preemptive interpretation of the FAA that is now 
enshrined in a variety of opinions by the U.S. Supreme 
Court.200  Since preemption is now the rule if at issue is a 
state public policy inconsistent with broad interpretation of 
the pro-arbitration policy of the FAA, the proposals 
generally depend upon the finding of congressional intent to 
preclude arbitration for certain types of disputes; effectively 
 
195 Becerra, 438 F. Supp. 3d at 1108. 
196 Becerra, 438 F. Supp. 3d at 1108.  
197 See Spitko, supra note 121. 
198 Spitko, supra note 121. 
199 Becerra, 438 F. Supp. 3d at 1108; see Anthony J. Oncidi et al., Federal Court 
Strikes Down California’s “Request Arbitration, Go to Jail” Law, THE 
NATIONAL LAW REVIEW (Feb. 12, 2020), 
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/federal-court-strikes-down-california-s-
request-arbitration-go-to-jail-law.  
200 See, e.g., AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 1753 
(2011);  Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 359 (2008):  Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. 
Leland Stanford Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 470, 479 (1989); Perry v. Thomas, 482 
U.S. 483, 491–92 (1987);  Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984);  
Spitko, supra note 121. 
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amending the FAA by constricting its application.201  We 
have one example of this approach being realized, as the 
federal McCarran-Ferguson Act, which provides that state 
law preempts federal law with respect to the business of 
insurance.202  Another is the 2010 Dodd Frank Act in which 
Congress authorized the Securities and Exchange 
Commission and Consumer Financial Protection Bureau to 
regulate the use of arbitration in broker–dealer and consumer 
financial contracts.203 
However, despite the many attempts to reverse 
federal preemption in areas of preeminent state public policy 
concern, such as labor and consumer rights, the record is one 
of failure of the necessary Congressional consensus.204  
There is no reason to expect this political reality to change 
in the forseeable future given the powerful economic 
interests that have managed to use arbitration clauses and 
federal preemption under the FAA to negate procedural 
rights, such as the class action, or substantive rights 
 
201 See generally supra note 200.  
202 An example is the McCarran-Ferguson Act, which provides that state law 
preempts federal law with respect to insurance, stating “[n]o Act of Congress 
shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any 
state for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance . . . unless such Act 
specifically relates to the business of insurance.”  15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1947). 
203 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111–203, 124 Stat. 1376, § 921 (2010) (authorizing Securities Exchange 
Commission to regulate broker-dealers’ use of arbitration in customer 
agreements);  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 
Pub. L. No. 111–203, 124 Stat. 1376, § 922 (2010) (prohibiting arbitration of 
certain whistleblower claims);  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111–203, 124 Stat. 1376, § 1028 (2010) 
(authorizing Consumer Financial Protection Bureaus to regulate consumer 
financial companies’ use of arbitration);  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111–203, 124 Stat. 1376, § 1057(d) 
(2010) (prohibiting arbitration of certain whistleblower claims created by 
Dodd-Frank);  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 
Pub. L. No. 111–203, 124 Stat. 1376, § 1414 (2010) (prohibiting use of 
arbitration clauses in residential mortgage contracts). 
204 See references to a multitude of unsuccessful bills to have Congress 
invalidate predispute arbitration agreements, collected in Spitko, supra note 
121, at 50–51, nn. 223–24. 
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grounded in state policies of labor, consumer, or 
environmental regulation.205   
In the ongoing campaign to limit the impact of the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s broadly pre-emptive reading of the 
FAA, there has been the proposal of some sort of federal 
deus ex machina to decide when state public policy should 
not be preempted by the FAA.206  For example, one proposed 
solution is creation of a federal overseer with expertise in 
labor law with the power to strike a balance between state 
employment regulation and enforcement of arbitration 
agreements under the FAA.207  The model drawn on to 
support this proposal is securities arbitration under the aegis 
of “FINRA,” which today administers most arbitrations of 
securities disputes.208   
Surely though, any suggestion of a federal 
bureaucratic means to reconcile conflict between the FAA 
and state public policy is fundamentally misconceived.  
There is a constitutionally profound difference between a 
federal agency that employs arbitration to resolve conflicts 
under a given state or federal law, as does FINRA, and an 
agency, as proposed, that would have the power to resolve a 
conflict between state public policy and the FAA.  The 
former is conflict resolution under a particular law.209  The 
proposed bureaucratic solution would be the transfer to a 
federal bureaucracy of the power to resolve a conflict 
between federal and state law, a power constitutionally 
relegated in its ultimate resolution under the United States 
Constitution, never to any bureaucracy, but to the federal 
 
205 See generally Spitko, supra note 121, at 50–51, nn. 223–24. 
206 See generally Note, State Courts and the Federalization of Arbitration Law, 
134, HARV. L. REV. 1184, (2021). 
207 See Spitko, supra note 121, at 54. 
208 Spitko, supra note 121, at 54–55; see also Constantine N. Katsoris, 
Securities Arbitrators Do Not Grow on Trees, 14 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 
49, 62, 64 (2008). 
209 See generally About FINRA, FINRA.ORG, https://www.finra.org/about. 
49
Garvey: Arbitration With Government
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2021
[Vol. 21: 281, 2021]                                     Arbitration With Government 
                                             PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL  
 
 330 
courts, and ultimately the U.S. Supreme Court.210  The U.S. 
Supreme Court, having already determined that the FAA and 
its pro-arbitration policy prevails in all cases where the 
efficiency value of arbitration may be put at risk by state law, 
any proposal for a federal bureaucracy to resolve conflict 
between state policy and the FAA, in any case, is a non-
starter.211   
Congress surely has the power to amend the 
FAA.212  Congress no doubt could resolve the conflict in any 
area of state concern by providing that state policies, whether 
on employment, consumer rights, or environmental 
concerns, or in any area within its power to legislate, should 
prevail.  But without Congress itself expressly providing for 
particular state policy to trump the pro-arbitration policy of 
the FAA, Congress does not have the power to compromise 
the exclusive authority of the federal courts to resolve public 
policy conflict when the question is one of federal 
preemption.213  
i. ARBITRATION WITH GOVERNMENT 
AND COLLABORATIVE CONFLICT 
RESOLUTION  
It is possible to minimize public policy concern yet 
utilize arbitral process by designing arbitration as 
conjunctive with collaborative process.  We see this 
alternative particularly in the arena of  governmental 
interagency arbitration, though it can be utilized in any arena 
 
210 See, e.g., JAY B. SYKES & NICOLE VANATKO, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45825, 
FEDERAL PREEMPTION: A LEGAL PRIMER (July 23, 2019), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45825.pdf.  
211 See Lea Haber Kuck et al., The Supreme Court and Evolving Arbitration 
Jurisprudence, SKADDEN, (September 26, 2019), 
https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2019/09/quarterly-
insights/the-supreme-court-and-evolving-. 
212 U.S. Const. art. I, § 1, cl. 1. 
213 See generally James C. Sturdevant, Federal Preemption Cases: Reflections 
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of arbitration with government.214  If there is reason to adopt 
a more collaborative process in conjunction with arbitration 
to realize public policy despite the preemptive impact of the 
FAA, how might that be done? 
Arbitration employed for dispute resolution 
between governments or governmental entities provides the 
best demonstration of possible collaborative process, 
because it typically involves contending public policies or 
governmental interests contending for recognition, as well as 
ongoing intergovernmental relationships which the 
contending parties wish to nonetheless preserve.215  For 
governmental interagency arbitration, or arbitration between 
governments, the fusion with more collaborative processes 
akin to mediation and negotiation can be especially 
opportunistic. 
In commercial arbitration, usually mediation and 
negotiation, as available modes of dispute resolution, are 
kept separate and distinct from arbitration—and for good 
reasons.216  The most significant reason is that negotiation 
for dispute resolution is facilitated when the parties do not 
risk that positions stated and information disclosed in 
mediation or negotiation as collaborative process will 
undermine their positions in arbitration as an adversarial 
process.217  Accordingly, most court systems and provisions 
for mediation or negotiation provide for non-binding 
mediation and/or negotiation to precede arbitration, and 
include, as appropriate, assurances against disclosure.218 
 
214 See generally Sarah B. Belter, The Use of Arbitration By Federal Agencies 
To Solve Environmental Disputes: All Wrapped Up In Red Tape, 56, U. MIAMI 
L. REV., 1033, (2002).  
215 See generally Daniel T. Deacon, Agencies and Arbitration, 117, COLUM. L. 
REV., 992, (2017). 
216 See generally Mediation of Legal Disputes-The Basic Law, STIMMEL, 
STIMMEL & ROESER, https://www.stimmel-law.com/en/articles/mediation-
legal-disputes-basic-law. 
217 STIMMEL, STIMMEL & ROESER, supra note 216.  
218 STIMMEL, STIMMEL & ROESER, supra note 216. 
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To the contrary, there is an outstanding model for 
the fusion of arbitration and collaborative process when 
governmental interest is involved.219  This is the formulation 
that became the “Side Agreements on Labor and the 
Environment” for the NAFTA trade agreement of the United 
States, Canada and Mexico.220  The appeal of that 
formulation was well demonstrated by the fact that it became 
key to securing the NAFTA Treaty approval by the three 
governments, despite resistance from their respective 
domestic labor and environmental constituencies.221   
The essentials of that design can be stated briefly, 
though their elaboration warrants study for any replication 
of what was achieved.222  The scheme is to begin dispute 
resolution with negotiations at the highest governmental 
level available, then to proceed to arbitration if those 
negotiations do not resolve the dispute.223  However, the 
design is exceptional in that the arbitrators’ work is not to 
directly provide an award, but instead, to propose a mutually 
satisfactory action plan.224  If the complained against party 
rejects that plan, that party then has the burden of proposing 
its own solution which the arbitrators can accept or reject.225  
If the arbitrators reject the complained-against party’s 
proposed solution, the complained-against party’s failure to 
comply with the arbitrator-mandated plan through the end of 
the process can result in sanction, first by fine, and if that 
doesn’t secure the arbitrator plan, ultimately a loss of trade 
 
219 See generally NAFTA and the Side Agreements: Risks in Turning NAFTA 
Into a Labor/Environmental Pact, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, (May 13, 
1993), https://www.heritage.org/trade/report/nafta-and-the-side-agreements-
risks-turning-nafta-laborenvironmental-pact. 
220 THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, supra note 219.  
221 THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, supra note 219. 
222 Jack I. Garvey, Trade Law and Quality of Life-Dispute Resolution Under 
the NAFTA Side Accords on Labor and the Environment, 89 AM. J. INT’L. L. 
439 (1995). 
223 See Garvey, supra note 222. 
224 See Garvey, supra note 222. 
225 See Garvey, supra note 222. 
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benefits.226  This design incorporates a number of 
opportunities to negotiate along the course of this process 
(which as originally formulated) is supposed to take a 
maximum total of 1,225 days.227  
The model’s uniqueness and advantage is to achieve 
a fusion of political and legal process, maximizing the 
expression and accommodation of the public policy interests 
of the parties, while providing continuing opportunity for 
consensual resolution.228  Arbitration is employed more to 
drive the process of resolution than to provide an award—
more to educate the parties concerning constructive 
resolution and enforce that outcome only if they cannot 
reach resolution.229  The objective is to avoid the need to 
employ the ultimate sanction of loss of trade benefits, a 
result that would be counterproductive to the parties’ shared 
purpose to further free trade.230  This is a design that 
acknowledges the political reality that it is the parties who 
best understand the respective interests they represent.231  
But it employs arbitration and potential sanction to compel 
the parties to find a practical solution.232  It is a design that 
maximizes the capacity of arbitration, in contrast to 
litigation, to achieve a solution instead of a winner.233  
Presumably, that is the most desirable endgame for 
intergovernmental arbitration, for interagency governmental 
disputes at the state or federal level, between state and 
federal governmental agencies, or as it could be employed 
for disputes between government and private parties.   
 
226 See Garvey, supra note 222. 
227 Garvey, supra note 222, at 444. 
228 See Garvey, supra note 222. 
229 Garvey, supra note 222, at 439. 
230 See Garvey, supra note 222. 
231 See Garvey, supra note 222. 
232 See Garvey, supra note 222. 
233 See Garvey, supra note 222. 
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ii. THE POWER OF THE ARBITRATOR 
TO SECURE PUBLIC POLICY 
 Might it be sufficient, where the clash is more 
strictly and blatantly between the absolutist pro-arbitration 
policy of the FAA as interpreted and state policy disallowing 
collaborative resolution, to rely on the arbitrator’s neutrality 
and expertise to advance the governmental public policy 
objectives involved in a dispute?  In other words, might the 
arbitrator’s power afford the saving grace for the realization 
of state public policy (though preemption in favor of the 
FAA is the prevailing rule where there is a clash)?  
Commands to assure the arbitrator’s neutrality are 
replete in arbitral rules.234  And as the conventional wisdom 
goes, one of the principal advantages of arbitration is to 
secure the neutral and objective expertise of a decision 
maker familiar with the policies pertinent to the nature of the 
dispute.235  Moreover, most arbitral rules recognize, unless 
otherwise stated in the arbitration agreement, that the 
arbitrator is empowered to provide equity between the 
parties.236   
This is no reassurance, of course, with respect to 
restoration of critical procedural matters, such as class 
actions or punitive damages, which the U.S. Supreme Court 
found to be specifically at odds with the FAA’s pro-
arbitration policy.237  But recognizing that arbitration 
includes significant discretion for the arbitrator, well beyond 
that of the litigation judge, to inject public policy into the 
arbitrator’s deliberations—does arbitration assure 
 
234 Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (1990). 
235 See Spitko, supra note 121, at 54. 
236 Broome, supra note 184. 
237  See, e.g., Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005); 
Gentry v. Superior Court, 165 P.3d 556, 569 (Cal. 2007); AT&T Mobility 
L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 336 (2011); Stipanowich, supra note 184; 
Broughton v. Cigna Healthplans of Cal., 988 P.2d 67 (Cal. 1999); Cruz v. 
PacifiCare Health Sys., Inc., 66 P.3d 1157 (Cal. 2003); Broome, supra note 
184; Spitko, supra note 121. 
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neutrality?  Moreover, if the arbitrator has the power to 
provide equity, isn’t “fairness” including all relevant public 
policy, the worthy objective?  Shouldn’t the attorney 
arbitrating with government want fairness even if emanating 
from the arbitrator’s amorphous equitable power?   
However, it is necessary to consider relatedly the 
common criticism of the arbitral process—that it is “too 
neutral.”238  The charge is commonly made, especially 
among the practicing bar, that arbitrators tend to render 
“compromise awards,” perhaps as a result of the contextual 
nature of the arbitral process—the decision maker and the 
parties’ attorneys in much closer and less formal interaction 
than in judicial litigation—often of previous professional 
acquaintance.239  More frequently than in judicial litigation, 
the lawyers and the “neutral” deciding their case share 
specific expertise, values, and relationships.240  Arbitrators 
are chosen for their particular expertise, and they and the 
lawyers who appear before them typically belong to the 
same professional communities—certainly more than when 
the lawyers appear before a judge of general jurisdiction 
drawn from the formal legal system.241  The arbitrators may 
indeed have an investment in not seriously displeasing 
particular colleagues.242  Incentive to render a compromise 
award and thereby not disenchant the lawyers involved may 
also be in the arbitrator’s interest to maintain future business 
in arbitral systems, such as those in the United States, that 
provide that the parties choose the arbitrators, if only from 
established lists, such as those employed by the American 
Arbitration Association.243  For these reasons, there is the 
 
238 McConnaughay, supra note 117, at 465. 
239 See Garvey, supra note 222. 
240 Jennifer C. Bailey, The Search to Clarify an Elusive Standard: What 
Relationships Between Arbitratir and Party Demonstrate Evident Partiality?, 
2000 J. DISP. RESOL. 153, 153 (2000). 
241 Bailey, supra note 240. 
242 Bailey, supra note 240. 
243 Bailey, supra note 240. 
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view that arbitrators are less inclined to issue an award that 
manifests a clear winner or loser. 244  
The common speculation that arbitration leads to 
compromise awards, in contradistinction to the winner and 
loser dynamic that drives court litigation, is belied to some 
degree by the common ambivalence and ambiguity as to who 
lost and who won often found as well in the result obtained 
from the litigation judge.245  Moreover, the speculation that 
arbitrators are less inclined to follow the law, and therefore 
more inclined to render compromise awards, can at least be 
said to be unsubstantiated given the empirical studies 
specifically designed to expose the phenomenon of arbitral 
compromise verdicts.246  Generally, these studies concluded 
that arbitrators do not commonly engage in “splitting the 
baby,” and that arbitral awards do result in clear winners and 
losers no less than in the formal litigation system.247   
But the widespread though unsubstantiated belief 
that an arbitrator is more likely than a litigation judge to split 
the baby merits special caution for the government lawyer.  
The risk of a compromise result from a decision maker not 
constrained by rights of appeal should be of special concern 
when the government lawyer is dealing with a matter of 
significant social policy and impact that warrants a clear 
result for deterrence or other purposes relating to other 
cases.248  The caution is to avoid arbitration for such matters, 
or, if there is good reason nevertheless to secure the 
advantages of arbitration, to carefully examine the reputation 
 
244 See Garvey, supra note 222. 
245 See Garvey, supra note 222. 
246 Christopher R. Drahozal, Empirical Findings on International Arbitration: 
An Overview, OXFORD HANDBOOK ON INTL. ARBITRATION 1, 25 (Dec. 21, 
2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2888552. 
247 See Stephanie Keer & Richard Naimark, Arbitrators Do Not “Split the 
Baby”: Empirical Evidence from International Business Arbitration: Collected 
Empirical Research (2001), reprinted in Towards A Science Of International 
Arbitration: Collected Empirical Research 311 (Drahozal & Naimark eds., 
2005). 
248 See Garvey, supra note 222. 
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of a particular arbitrator for objective disposition before 
agreeing to his or her appointment.249 
With respect to “fairness” in arbitration, we should 
also recognize that party autonomy means that if there is 
inordinate leverage between the parties that results in the 
choice of arbitration, it can naturally lead to unfairness as to 
any procedural or substantive aspect of arbitration.250  For 
example, the health care contracts of the Kaiser System in 
California formerly provided that only Kaiser doctors could 
act as arbitrators.251  Besides the obvious problem of inherent 
bias, an apparent result was that delays in the system 
engineered by the doctors, in their self-defense, famously 
allowed an inordinate number of patients to die before there 
could be arbitration of their claims.252   
 
249 Dominique Hascher, J., Independence and Impartiality of Arbitrators: 3 
Issues, 27 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 789, 792–798 (2012) 
https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1784&c
ontext=auilr&httpsredir=1&referer=;  see also Joan Stearns Johnsen, Why Your 
Arbitrator Is Biased, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (Mar. 18, 2015), 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/alternative-
dispute-resolution/practice/2015/why-your-arbitrator-is-biased/. 
250 Lisa B. Bingham, On Repeat Players, Adhesive Contracts, and the Use of 
Statistics in Judicial Review of Employment Arbitration Awards, 29 
MCGEORGE L. REV. 223, 240 (1988); Bernard D. Meltzer, Ruminations About 
Ideology, Law, and Labor Arbitration, Proceedings of the 20th Annual Meeting 
of the National Academy of Arbitrators 1, 3–4 (1967); Silver-Greenberg, supra 
note 164; Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc., 15 Cal. 4th 951 (Cal. 
1997). 
251 Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc., 15 Cal. 4th 951 (Cal. 1997). 
252 Engalla, 15 Cal. 4th at 951.  Thus, in Engalla the California Supreme Court 
considered whether such circumstances of disproportionate leverage renders an 
arbitration agreement unenforceable.  Engalla, 15 Cal. 4th at 951.  Patient 
Engalla claimed Kaiser committed medical malpractice because its employees 
were negligent in detecting and diagnosing  Engalla’s lung cancer over the 
course of several years.  Engalla, 15 Cal. 4th at 951.  In accordance with the 
terms of Engalla’s service agreement with Kaiser, the malpractice dispute was 
sent to arbitration.  Engalla, 15 Cal. 4th at 951.  Engalla made every effort to 
comply with the Kaiser-designed arbitration system and seek a speedy hearing 
because he was terminally ill from the undiagnosed lung cancer.  Engalla, 15 
Cal. 4th at 951.  After Engalla died, with the medical malpractice dispute, not 
having been heard by the tribunal, the Engalla family brought an action in the 
California state court system.  Engalla, 15 Cal. 4th at 951.  The Engallas alleged 
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Similarly, in reference to bias and leverage, U.S. 
investment houses have provided that arbitrators in 
securities cases are required to be members of the National 
Association of Securities Dealers.253  To the same unfair 
effect, consumer contracts leveraged by large consumer 
product producers include arbitration clauses waiving class 
 
Kaiser’s self-administered arbitration system was corrupt and Kaiser 
intentionally delayed the arbitration process so the hearing would occur after 
Engalla’s death.  Engalla, 15 Cal. 4th at 951.  The California Supreme Court 
affirmed the policy of enforcing arbitration agreements, but stated that where a 
party acts wrongfully and fraudulently, the enforceability of the arbitration 
clause may be limited.  Engalla, 15 Cal. 4th at 951.  The court’s finding was 
that Kaiser’s arbitration program was “designed, written, mandated and 
administered by Kaiser.” Engalla, 15 Cal. 4th at 962.  Kaiser did not disclose 
that it designed and administered the arbitration procedure to Engalla through 
the arbitration clause in the service agreement, nor through any publications on 
the procedure.  Engalla, 15 Cal. 4th at 962.  Kaiser’s reserved control of the 
arbitration system enabled Kaiser to repeatedly delay steps in the arbitration 
process, such as the timeliness of selecting the arbitrators.  Engalla, 15 Cal. 4th 
at 962.  The arbitration agreement provided for each party to select an arbitrator, 
then the two arbitrators select a third, neutral arbitrator.  Engalla, 15 Cal. 4th at 
962.  “[I]n reality, the [neutral third arbitrator] selection is made by defense 
counsel after consultation with the Kaiser medical-legal department.  Kaiser has 
never relinquished control over this selection decision.”  Engalla, 15 Cal. 4th 
at 965.  The court further noted that the arbitration panel should have been 
established within sixty days.  Engalla, 15 Cal. 4th at 965.  But, due to Kaiser’s 
systemic delays, the process took three additional months, until the day before 
Engalla’s death.  Engalla, 15 Cal. 4th at 965.  Evidence revealed these delays 
were widespread and commonplace, and that Kaiser knew of the problem.  
Engalla, 15 Cal. 4th at 965.  The California Supreme Court remanded the case 
to resolve factual disputes related to Kaiser’s fraud.  Engalla, 15 Cal. 4th at 965.  
If the lower court found Kaiser was fraudulent, it could strip Kaiser of its ability 
to compel arbitration.  Engalla, 15 Cal. 4th at 965.  Engalla, and the broad abuse 
it exposed, thus demonstrates that where one party is completely autonomous 
in its forum selection and arbitration procedures, critical unfairness, such as 
delaying arbitration until a terminally ill patient dies, can result.  Engalla, 15 
Cal. 4th at 965.  
253 Julia Kagan, National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), 
INVESTOPEDIA.COM, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/n/nasd.asp; 
FindLaw Attorney Writers, NASD Arbitration of Securities Disputes, 
CORPORATE.FINDLAW.COM, https://corporate.findlaw.com/litigation-
disputes/nasd-arbitration-of-securities-disputes.html;  Registration, Exams, and 
CE, FINRA.ORG, https://www.finra.org/registration-exams-ce/individuals. 
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actions and punitive damages, making the pursuance of 
consumer claims economically unsupportable.254  Is there 
neutrality when the mere designation of arbitration means 
loss of the right of neutral disposition, as where certain 
industries, applying their leverage against employees and 
labor unions, insert arbitration clauses that limit the nature 
and extent of the complaints that can be brought before the 
arbitrator, thereby diminishing labor rights?255 
An even more insidious unfairness than outright 
bias or inherent leverage can result from the economic 
interest of the arbitrator harnessed by a party who presents 
the implied promise of repeat business as the reward for a 
favorable result.256  This dynamic is entirely absent from 
judicial litigation; however, in arbitration, it favors the party 
who presents the greater potential for future business for the 
arbitrator.257  The implicit economics of a dispute involving 
an arbitrator with a once-only party on the one side and a 
potential repeat customer on the other may bias results.258  
This dynamic, sometimes identified as “the repeat player 
advantage,” typically means favoring the large over the 
small, the company over the consumer or employee, and 
even the state over its citizens.259  The potential for the 
operation of this dynamic in any particular case should 
 
254 See generally Silver-Greenberg, supra note 164; see also Bingham, supra 
note 250.  
255 Bingham, supra note 250. 
256 Meltzer, supra note 250, at 3-4 (1967);  Lisa B. Bingham, Employment 
Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMP. RIGHTS AND EMP’T POLICY J., 
189 (1997). 
257 Bingham, supra note 256. 
258 Bingham, supra note 256. 
259 See Bingham, supra note 256; Silver-Greenberg, supra note 164 (analyzing 
the effects of arbitration across multiple industries, especially noting the 
disproportionate leverage held by credit card companies, employers, and other 
commercial entities);  Sarah Rudolph Cole, Uniform Arbitration: “One Size 
Fits All” Does Not Fit, 16 OHIO ST. J. DISPUTE RESOL. 759, 767–71 (2001) 
(distinguishing between arbitration practiced among repeat players, such as 
merchants, and that between repeat players and one-shot players, such as 
employees). 
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certainly be taken into consideration by any lawyer before 
choosing arbitration. 
Additionally, as to the potential for bias in 
governmental arbitration, arbitrators, counsel, and expert 
witnesses in any given proceeding may have previously 
worked on the same matters and crossed paths in one 
professional context or another.260  This reality is not unique 
to arbitration with government but is most pronounced 
where there are concentrated communities of expertise 
involved in particular areas of governmental activity.261  
Arbitral systems, such as that of the American Arbitration 
Association, are meticulous in requiring pervasive 
disclosures that serve to police such associations that could 
create conflicts of interest.262  The Administrative Dispute 
Resolution Act (ADRA) requires neutrality by prohibiting 
any financial or personal conflict of interest.263  For 
international arbitrations, the U.N. Commission on 
International Trade Law is also exemplary in requiring prior 
disclosure of any conflicts.264  However, the nature of 
professional relationships and unconscious bias involved 
may not be fully comprehended by objective standards, 
 
260 See Drew Hushka, How Nice to See You Again: The Repetitive Use of 
Arbitrators and the Risk of Evident Partiality, 5 Y.B. ARB. & MEDIATION, 325 
(2013);  Lawal v. Northern Spirit Ltd. (2003) UKHL 35, 21-23; see also 
William Park, Arbitrator Bias, TRANSNATIONAL DISP. MGMT. BOS. U. SCHOOL 
OF LAW 6–7, 24–31, 33–38, 45 (2015); Katherine Stone & Alexander Colvin, 
The Arbitration Epidemic, ECON. POLICY INST. (Dec. 7, 2015), 
https://www.epi.org/publication/the-arbitration-epidemic/. 
261 Katherine Stone, Rustic Justice: Community and Coercion under the Federal 
Arbitration Act, 77 N. CAROLINA LAW REV. 931,1015–1026 (1999); see 
genrally Lawal v. Northern Spirit Ltd. (2003) UKHL 35. 
262Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures, R-19(a), 
AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION (Oct. 1, 2013), 
https://adr.org/sites/default/files/Commercial%20Rules.pdf. 
263 5 U.S.C. §§571-584 (current through Pub. L. No. 116–187). 
264 U.N. Commission on International Trade Law, UNCITRAL Model Law on 
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where there is past joint participation in a litigation.265  
Arbitrators hired for their expertise in particular areas of 
governmental regulation often confront the same counsel in 
different cases, whether at the state or federal level.266 
Indeed, as previously noted in relation to the 
potential for compromise awards, the arbitrators  are drawn 
from the same communities as the lawyers appearing before 
them.267  Litigation judges, though drawn from the same 
professional communities as the lawyer appearing before 
them, are prohibited from operating as an advocate or expert 
witness through their entire service as judge, and are subject 
to constraint from fraternizing with the advocates who are 
before them or with potential witnesses.268  Arbitration is 
more dependent on personal ongoing relationships, and the 
nature of those relationships may cross over considerably 
from social to legal.269  Because arbitrators are drawn from 
the practice community in which they currently participate, 
unlike the litigation judge who may be from that same 
community but must cut ties, there is an ongoing natural 
fraternity of interest for the arbitrator, and accordingly, a 
more significant potential source of bias.270  In contrast to 
the litigation judge, an individual who is appointed to 
arbitrate your case may have also participated in relatively 
 
265 Lawal v. Northern Spirit Ltd. (2003) UKHL 35, 21-23; see also Stavros 
Brekoulakis, Systemic Bias and the Institution of International Arbitration: A 
New Approach to Arbitral Decision-Making, 4 J. OF INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 
553, 556–57, 561–63 (2013). 
266 See generally Hushka, supra, note 260; Lawal v. Northern Spirit Ltd. (2003) 
UKHL 35. 
267 See Park, supra note 260, at 6–7, 24–31, 33–38, 45 (2015); Stone & Colvin, 
supra note 260; see also Hushka, supra note 260. 
268 Judge as an Expert Witness, Opinion No. 139 (1991) 
https://www.law.uh.edu/libraries/ethics/Judicial/jeao/101-200/jeao139.html. 
269 Cole, supra note 259. 
270 Thus in recognition of the subconscious bias this may engender, the British 
House of Lords has held that lawyers who serve as part-time judges may not 
appear as counsel before an Employment Appeal Tribunal, because that would 
create a risk of bias and undermine public confidence regarding the 
independence of arbitrators.  Lawal v. Northern Spirit Ltd. (2003) UKHL 35, 
21–23. 
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current time frame as an advocate, consultant, or expert 
witness (hired by the parties or by the tribunal itself).271  
Often such ongoing experience is what is deemed to qualify 
an individual to serve as arbitrator.272  This experience 
presents a particularly rich potential for bias however long 
the list of disclaimers of conflict of interest that may be 
required by the arbitral forum.  
iii.  THE SALUTARY INFLUENCE OF 
EPISTEMIC COMMUNITY 
 Here, though, is the profound irony in arbitration 
with Government, and potentially its saving grace.  The 
same community of interest that holds potential to bias the 
arbitrator, can be an important source of support for the 
realization of public policy.  Those who arbitrate 
government contracts are a community of shared expertise 
with kindred professional values born of common education 
in the public policies involved in pertinent statutory and 
adjudicative authority.  As a sociological and political 
reality, such communities of shared values and sensibilities 
have been sometimes identified as “epistemic 
communities.”273 
 
271 As Judge Posner of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has 
observed, in choosing to arbitrate, “(t)here is a tradeoff between impartiality 
and expertise,” and therefore the test for disqualification must turn on evidence 
of the arbitrator’s impartiality.  Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 714 F.2d 
673, 679–80 (1983). 
272 Merit, 714 F.2d at 166. 
273 See Peter Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International 
Policy Coordination, 46 INT’L ORG. 1, 3 (1992) wherein ‘epistemic 
communities’ are defined as: “network(s) of professionals with recognized 
expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to 
policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area.  Although an 
epistemic community may consist of professionals from a variety of disciplines 
and backgrounds, they have (1) a shared set of normative and principled beliefs, 
which provide a value-based rationale for the social action of community 
members;  (2) shared causal beliefs, which are derived from their analysis of 
practices leading or contributing to a central set of problems in their domain 
and which can then serve as the basis for elucidating the multiple linkages 
between possible policy actions and desired outcomes (3);  shared notions of 
validity –that is, intersubjective, internally defined criteria for weighing and 
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As a threshold matter when arbitration is employed 
by government, there are the formal constraints of 
disclaimers of conflict of interest required by virtually every 
arbitral institution, which today can be quite detailed and far 
reaching, purporting to cover all avenues of potential 
conflicts of interest such as any of a wide variety of 
relationships to the parties, or elements of self-interest.274  
But shared interests and responsibilities can also by their 
very nature engender therapeutic constraint against bias, and 
the realization of socially beneficial public policy.  Though 
there is no review of the arbitrator’s judgment on the merits, 
there is the informal constraint of the arbitrator’s 
professional ethics and reputational concern, albeit related to 
the arbitrator’s economic concern to be chosen for future 
business.275  An able government counsel will advance any 
governmental policy or fairness concern that can trigger the 
arbitrator’s own sense of social responsibility and 
reputational interest.  This, of course, indicates the 
importance both of the choice of arbitrator, and the skills of 
interpersonal diplomacy the lawyers and arbitrator bring to 
the table in any given case.   
 Requirements of full disclosure through articulated 
disclaimers of conflict of interest and pre-vetted arbitrator 
lists can go a long way in enlisting this positive aspect of 
shared policy concerns and interests.  The Constitutional 
illegitimacy of a proposed federal bureaucracy, as discussed 
above, to determine when state public policy or the pro-
arbitration policy of the FAA should prevail, does not 
 
validating knowledge in the domain of their expertise; and (4) a common policy 
enterprise—that is, a set of common practices associated with a set of problems 
to which their professional competence is directed, presumably out of 
conviction that human welfare will be enhanced as a consequence.” Haas, 
supra.   
274 See generally, Rogers, supra note 46; American Arbitration Association, 
supra note 17; Singapore International Arbitration Center, SIAC Rules 2016 
6th ed. (Aug. 1, 2016), https://www.siac.org.sg/our-rules/rules/siac-rules-2016. 
275 Garvey, supra note 222. 
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preclude the inclusion of a bureaucratic authority to select an 
arbitrator from among a list of those qualified by education 
and experience to serve as the neutral decision maker.276  
Indeed, for certain governmental arbitration U.S. statutes 
and regulations so provide, by way of designation of a 
governmental official with the authority to designate an 
arbitrator from a pre-vetted official or unofficial list.277 
There are also in service of the better aspects of 
epistemic community interest, the shared standards of 
professional ethics,278 rules of procedure to ensure 
fairness,279 transparency and improved informational 
resources for the selection of arbitrators, and increased 
transparency for the challenge of arbitrators.280  Moreover, 
major arbitral institutions have established training and 
certification programs, which are often made mandatory for 
would-be arbitrators.281  
  It is clearly in the interest of government lawyers to 
support such developments.  The party autonomy that is the 
foundation of arbitration means that the government lawyer 
is positioned to accomplish a great deal as to all provisions 
to ensure fairness by selecting and demanding adherence to 
these requirements of fairness as the sin qua non of the 
choice to arbitrate. 
 
276 Garvey, supra note 222. 
277 See 5 U.S.C. § 577(a) (1990); 14 C.F.R. § 17.35 (2011), which provides that 
the Office of Dispute Resolution for Acquisition (ODRA), upon agreement of 
the parties, may designate an ODRA Dispute Resolution Officer (DRO) to serve 
as arbitrator, or alternatively that the ODRA make qualified personnel to serve 
as arbitrator. 
278 Rogers, supra note 114; American Arbitration Association, supra note 17.  
279 See Emmanuel Jolivet, Access to Information and Awards, 22 ARB. INT’L. 
265 (2006).  This development importantly includes improving the efficiency 
of arbitration as to time and cost; see also Harold S. Crowter & Anthony G.V. 
Tobin, Ensuring that Arbitration Remains a Preferred Option for International 
Dispute Resolution, 19 J. INT’L. ARB. 301 (2002).  
280 See, e.g., Director General’s Review of 2006, London Court of International 
Arbitration, 1 (2006).  
281 Florian Grizel, Control of Awards and Re-Centralisation of International 
Commercial Arbitration, 25 CIV. JUST. Q. 166, 167 (2006). 
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There is also therapeutic value the parties 
themselves can craft into the arbitral process, such as 
stipulating for reasoned awards and their publication when 
possible.282  This can serve importantly in minimizing the 
risk of bias or the risk that important public policy will be 
ignored. The government lawyer, given party autonomy as 
the foundation of arbitration, can take the initiative to insist 
on such requirements. 
Providing for a reasoned award and its publication 
establishes the opportunity to promote and enhance 
predictability in all relevant arenas of governmental interest, 
ranging from employer–employee relations to public–
private partnerships and social services.  Even if not of 
precedential value, such opinions can create at least informal 
standards for regulation of virtually all areas of 
governmental concern and regulation: such as in the 
workplace, government, or commerce, setting guidelines for 
economic development and social welfare in all its diverse 
aspects.  The requirement of a reasoned award, as articulated 
and exploited by the government lawyer, can serve to engage 
awareness of the arbitral tribunal that it will be compelled to 
justify its award, can serve to motivate engagement and a 
higher level of analysis and scrutiny than the mere issuance 
of an award, and can force the arbitral tribunal to obtain 
better knowledge of the law as the background for the award, 
notwithstanding that the award is unsusceptible to reversal 
on the merits.283  Exposure achieved by the requirement of a 
fully reasoned and published award is indeed protection 
against unprincipled decision, confronting the arbitral 
tribunal with the prospect of critique compelling self-
examination and requiring justification.284  Such 
accountability encourages well-reasoned decisions, as well 
as providing a basis for the lawyers on both sides of the 
 
282 Grizel, supra note 282, at 167.  
283 Stephen Hayford, Law in Disarray: Judicial Standards for Vactatur of 
Commercial Arbitration Awards, 30 GA. L. REV. 731, 798–99 (1996). 
284 Hayford, supra note 283, at 798–99, 841–42. 
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dispute to better evaluate the quality of an arbitrator for 
future selection, and for rejecting the incompetent.   
The net result of a process subject to scrutiny, in 
terms of the public perception and the public interest, is 
greater legitimacy for arbitration and its results, and a greater 
willingness to employ its advantages of more expeditious 
dispute resolution than in the formal litigation system, while 
achieving the cost savings that usually can be secured by 
dispute resolution through arbitration.285  However, to 
maximize the benefits, it is up to the government lawyer to 
proactively articulate and refine the detail of desired award, 
both in the drafting of the arbitration clause and later when 
engaged within the arbitral process.   
A proactive participation of the government lawyer 
similarly can enhance the process by which the arbitral 
tribunal deliberates the merits, most importantly in 
achieving maximal transparency.  The demand for 
transparency in all possible aspects, just as for a thoroughly 
reasoned award, should be articulated in drafting the 
arbitration clause and throughout the process.  Transparency 
and publication can also provide information for 
policymakers for collaterally evaluating public law and 
public administration.286  Moreover, it is the government 
lawyer who is best situated to engage and promote the public 
interest by encouraging and allowing information and 
argument, such as through amicus filings by civil society 
organizations and other affected third parties, especially 
where there are significant impacts on third parties and 
society at large, as for example, in cases of regulatory 
takings.287  All this also can be accomplished in the drafting 
of the arbitration agreement and creative interjection of the 
 
285 Sarah Rudolph Cole, Curbing the Runaway Arbitrator in Commercial 
Arbitration: Making Exceeding the Powers Count, 68 ALA. L. REV. 179, 185 
n.22 (2016). 
286 Amy Schmitz, Secrecy and Transparency in Dispute Resolution: Untangling 
the Privacy Paradox in Arbitration, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1211, 1238–41 (2006). 
287 Schmitz, supra note 286, at 1238–41. 
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government lawyer during the operation of the arbitral 
process.   
The government lawyer indeed can play a critical 
role in ensuring the fullest transparency in the public interest, 
by drawing on instruction other than from the domestic legal 
system itself, instruction that is now available to be drawn 
especially from international legal development.  
Comprehensive guidelines to maximize transparency have 
been fulsomely developed by way of standards recently 
elaborated for international arbitration.288  Lawyers involved 
in government contracting accordingly should be at the 
forefront of articulating and requiring such standards.  The 
power to do so is inherent to the principle of party autonomy, 
and the government lawyer engaging in arbitration possesses 
the power to require these standards as the sin qua non in 
drafting an arbitration clause or agreement.   
There can surely be reasons to limit disclosure, but 
such limitation should be specific to the case and the facts if 
it is not to unduly subvert transparency.  For example, the 
arbitrator’s power includes making adequate provision for 
protection of trade secrets or other concerns of competitive 
advantage.  But at least when the public interest is the 
elephant in the room, which is generally the case when 
government is arbitrating its disputes, the presumption 
should be in favor of transparency.   
Moreover, any lawyer or arbitrator joined in the 
epistemic community of government lawyers and arbitrators 
should appreciate the therapeutic value of adoption of the 
procedural rules of a well-established arbitral system.  Over 
time these rules evolve to integrate concerns of fairness and 
procedural restraints on discretion derived from what has 
been learned from arbitrations gone wrong.  The 
administering bodies of various arbitral systems typically 
respond to complaints about process and modify their 
 
288  See Trans-Pacific Partnership, supra note 50. 
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procedures accordingly.  There is a special safety in not 
trying to reinvent the wheel by proceeding to arbitrate ad 
hoc, but instead to rely on adoption of an established arbitral 
institution and its corpus of established and tested standards.   
 There is, finally, a subtle but critical aspect to the 
potential value of arbitration for the government lawyer that 
goes well beyond the accounting for public policy as 
embodied in statute or decisional law.  Whether the 
government attorney is engaged in arbitration in commercial 
context or vis-a-vis other governments or representatives of 
other governmental agencies, the matter of cultural 
awareness is of special importance.289  Cultural sensitivity is 
more likely of special importance for government attorneys 
considering the choice of arbitration, rather than for private 
sector attorneys, because of the different interests they 
represent.290  In commercial arbitration, the parties—their 
attorneys and the arbitrator—generally represent a 
homogeneous cut of the national population, gauged in terms 
of education, professionalism, or social class.291  In other 
words, commercial arbitration, being commercial, is about 
wealth—those who enjoy the advantages of wealth, and 
those who have enough wealth to afford to be fighting about 
it through legal process and lawyers.292  In arbitration 
involving government, however, the government lawyer 
represents the diverse interests of society at large.293  The 
client base, for a government attorney—in the ultimate 
respect of citizenship—includes not only the wealthy and 
educated, but also the poor and middle class populations—
many of who are without the advantage of being able to 
 
289 Theodore K. Cheng, Developing Skills to Address Cultural Issues in 
Arbitration and Mediation, 72 DISP. RESOL. J. 1, 5 (2017). 
290 Cheng, supra note 289.  
291 Jaque I. Garvey, ARBITRATION INVOLVING GOVERNMENTAL 
ENTITIES, 1 REVISTA ELETRÔNICA DA PROCURADORIA GERAL DO ESTADO DO 
RIO DE JANEIRO 1, 17 [Elec. J. of the Attorney General of the State of Rio de 
Janerio] (2018). 
292 Garvey, supra note 291. 
293 Garvey, supra note 291. 
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employ lawyers to handle their disputes, many isolated and 
alienated from the legal system.294   
These parties and their interests, whether physically 
participating in a given arbitration or not, may be detached 
and alienated from the court litigation system—except as 
represented by the government lawyer.295  The same is true 
for the government lawyer in arbitration—who is by nature 
of the office of government lawyers—charged with 
defending and enforcing the public trust.296  The challenge 
for the government lawyer in arbitration is to work on behalf 
of a much more diverse population of interests than the 
private commercial attorney, and to do so—for reasons here 
explained—before a neutral third party not mandated by 
public policy, but rather by party autonomy.297  Accordingly, 
this mutually appointed third party is freer than the litigation 
judge to ignore or respect the public trust.298  The greatest 
challenge, therefore—especially for the government 
attorney engaged in arbitration—is to represent those 
members of society who are more outside the legal system 
than within it.299  The need for legal representation of the 
disenfranchised and disabled imposes a greater 
responsibility for the government lawyer in arbitration.300  
There are procedural means to best realize the 
diversity of interests that the government lawyer should 
represent.  One technique that can be very effective to ensure 
that the ruling of the arbitrator conforms to the societal 
interests inherent in a dispute, is for the arbitrator, after 
hearing on the merits—but before the rendering of the 
award—to ask the parties themselves to provide the 
arbitrator with a draft order of the result that would work best 
 
294 Garvey, supra note 291. 
295 Garvey, supra note 291. 
296 Garvey, supra note 291. 
297 Garvey, supra note 291. 
298 Garvey, supra note 291. 
299 Garvey, supra note 291. 
300 Garvey, supra note 291. 
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for their circumstances and constituency.301  This may well 
produce results much more accommodative to the diversity 
of interests involved—and for all the parties involved, 
whether impacted directly or indirectly—than an arbitrator 
ruling without a refined background of understanding of the 
particular problems and potential solutions an award should 
ideally reflect. 
Relatedly concerning the social responsibility 
implicit in arbitration with government, there is the 
psychological dimension that a good lawyer should take into 
account—that we all experience a selective and biased 
process in our perception of external stimuli.302  This 
“golden rule” has long been recognized—the lawyer 
representing one side must stand in the shoes of the other.303  
Recognition of the same difficulty  appears in modern 
psychology, by way of the evidence of selective perception, 
whereby the same events can be interpreted very differently 
by two individuals.304  We tend see what is familiar—i.e., 
what is personally and culturally most akin to our 
community, whether cultural and/or professional.305  But as 
the golden rule requires, representation requires empathy.306  
For the government lawyer—who represents the large 
national community of a more diverse mix of social class and 
ethnic and cultural affinity than any lawyer in private 
 
301 Garvey, supra note 291. 
302 Garvey, supra note 291. 
303 Garvey, supra note 291. 
304 See, e.g., James W. Bagby, Cross-Cultural Study of Perceptual 
Predominance in Binocular Rivalry, 54 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 331, 
331–34 (1957).  A classic study in which one eye of subjects from the United 
States viewed, for a second, stereograms in which one eye was exposed to a 
baseball game and the other to a bull fight.  Supra at 331–34.  The subjects from 
the United States generally saw only the baseball game and the Mexican 
subjects saw only the bullfight.  Supra at 331–34.   
305 See, e.g., Bagby, supra note 304, at 331–34.   
306 Bagby, supra note 304.  
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practice—the need to step into the shoes of the other is 
especially a moral and psychological imperative.307 
Social science literature and jury psychology 
studies all indicate a fundamental truth about adjudicative 
neutrality—that the more diverse the group that engages in 
judgment (and therefore the more diverse the perceptions, 
observations and opinions engaged), the more likely the 
adjudicative body is to arrive at an objective assessment of 
the facts and analysis.308  It follows that the government 
 
307 See Guiguo Wang, The Belt and Road Initiative in Quest for a Dispute 
Resolution Mechanism, 25 ASIA PAC. L.R. 1 (2017); see also Chris Horton, The 
Costs of China’s Belt and Road Expansion, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 9, 2020), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2020/01/china-belt-road-
expansion-risks/604342/.  An innovative example of how to provide for 
maximizing cultural sensitivity in arbitration, is the provision for the “Blue 
Book” for dispute resolution that has been made within the major “Belt and 
Road” initiative of China.  Wang, supra.  This trade and investment initiative, 
unveiled in 2013, seeks to facilitate and generate trade and investment across a 
broad swath of Asia, by means of measures for a broad integration of 
international trade between China and its neighbors, stretching through multiple 
and diverse cultures.  Wang, supra.   These measures include, as importantly 
embodied in The Blue Book, a new set of rules covering conciliation, arbitration 
and appeal procedures, plus a set of transparency rules and code of conduct for 
conciliators and arbitrators.  Wang, supra.  Most notably in relation to the 
cultural challenges the Belt and Road initiative presents, the Blue Book permits 
the parties to agree that “at least one arbitrator shall have specific professional 
qualifications or expertise and/or understanding of local or regional culture and 
practices.”  Wang, supra.  This is in addition to the qualification requirements 
of objectivity, reliability and observance of rules of international conduct.  
Wang, supra.  Whether China’s aggressive trade expansion generates pushback 
to China’s Belt and Road initiative that belies this accommodation to cultural 
diversity is, of course, yet to be determined.  Wang, supra. 
308 See JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY:  THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE 
IDEAL OF DEMOCRACY 104 (Harv. Univ. Press ed., 1994) (citing, among other 
studies, Nancy J. King, Post-Conviction Review of Jury Discrimination: 
Measuring the Effects of Juror Decisions, 92 MICH. L. REV. 63 (1993); JON 
VAN DYKE, JURY SECTION PROCEDURES: OUR UNCERTAIN COMMITMENT TO 
REPRESENTATIVE PANELS (Ballinger Pub. Co. ed., 1977); Shirley S. Abramson, 
Justice and Juror, 20 GA. L. REV. 257, 257–98 (1986); Samuel R. Sommers, 
On Racial Diversity and Group Decision Making: Identifying Multiple Effects 
of Racial Composition on Jury Deliberations, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCH. 597 (2006); DOAK BISHOP & EDWARD G. KEHOE, THE ART OF 
ADVOCACY IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 519–581 (2d ed. 2010)) 
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attorney, seeking to represent society at large, should be 
especially inclined to maximize the diversity of experience 
and viewpoints available through arbitration.  Therefore, a 
government attorney agreeing to arbitration should seek to 
appoint an arbitrator who has a diversity of experience, both 
social and legal, and, where economically viable for the 
parties, appoint more than one arbitrator to achieve the 




Ultimately, it is party autonomy, the source of 
arbitral power, that controls arbitration to ensure that it 
serves rather than undermines good government.309  Because 
the arbitral process can be what the parties design it to be, 
the government lawyer, who anticipates the concerns and 
meets challenges here addressed, is best positioned to 
minimize the risks to the public interest that arbitration 
presents and to maximize its advantages.310   
The foundational principle of party autonomy 
empowers the government attorney to affect all aspects of 
arbitration.311  This even includes, when appropriate and 
desirable, rejection of arbitration for resolution of particular 
aspects of a particular dispute, or its limitation through 
exclusions to protect the public interest by narrowing or 
limiting the issues to be arbitrated.312  Party autonomy 
empowers the use of arbitration to achieve social good, so 
long as the government lawyer appreciates the proactive role 
that arbitration requires.313  Party autonomy makes possible 
negotiation and stipulation as to virtually all substantive 
 
(“[R]esearch indicates that when jurors of different ethnic groups deliberate 
together, they are better able to overcome their individual biases . . . .”). 
309 See Bockstiegel, supra note 57, at 25. 
310 See Bockstiegel, supra note 57, at 25. 
311 Garvey, supra note 222, at 444. 
312 Garvey, supra note 222, at 444. 
313 Garvey, supra note 222, at 444. 
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rights and obligations, and remedies of the parties, and all 
significant procedural aspects, whether presentation of 
witnesses, confidentiality, cross examination, preclusion of 
potential conflicts of interest and bias, and cultural 
representation.  Creative control through design of the 
arbitral proceedings can include the most useful 
requirements to serve the public interest at a significant level 
of specificity; for example, even detailed requirements such 
as concerning admission and use of expert witnesses and 
whether the arbitral panel can call its own expert, or 
witnesses, or conduct its own research.  
As the examination here reveals, there is much that 
can be accomplished by the government lawyer working 
within arbitral process to serve the public trust.  For the 
government lawyer, therefore, arbitration is ultimately an 
empowerment to serve the public interest.314  Success, 
however, depends on the government lawyer’s in-depth 
understanding of the complex opportunities presented within 
the arbitral process and understanding where the critical 
judgments in designing that process must be made.  There 
are no doubt risks.  Arbitration, despite its advantages, may 
override constraints that have enlightened the formal legal 
system through lessons learned in evolving the formal legal 
system towards better rule of law and justice.315  The 
government lawyer and arbitrator, who appreciate the risks 
but understand the capacities of arbitration to serve the 
public good, can fill an important role in bringing that same 
enlightenment to the alternative dispute resolution universe 
of arbitration. 
 
314 Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. 614. 
315 McConnaughay, supra note 117.  
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